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EDITORIAL
Good times are here for the euro area. The 
economic expansion is solid with GDP growing 
at an annual rate of 3% in the first quarter of 
this year and business and consumer confidence 
running high. Inflation has been stable at 
around 1.9% since November last year. It also 
looks like good times are there to stay for some 
time. The Commission's spring 2007 forecast 
estimates that the euro-area's economy will 
grow by 2.6% in 2007. This is an upward 
revision of ½ percentage point with respect to 
the autumn forecast. The inflation outlook also 
remains benign in the light of moderate wage 
growth, a revival in productivity growth and 
low imported inflation thanks to the euro's 
appreciation. Nevertheless, upward risks to 
prices may materialise as the cycle matures. 
The most recent national account data show 
that GDP growth in the first quarter was mainly 
driven by the high and accelerating growth rate 
of investment spending. By contrast, there was 
a small contraction in consumer spending, 
reflecting Germany's VAT increase. But as 
consumer confidence levels have approached an 
all-time high in the last few months, consumer 
spending seems to be all set to resume its 
upward momentum. Finally, the euro-area's 
export performance continued to benefit from 
a supportive international environment. 
However, with the easing of the so far 
exceptionally strong growth of world trade, the 
uncertain economic prospects for the USA and 
the appreciation of the euro, there is some risk 
that export growth will decelerate.  
Econometric estimates presented in this Report 
show that a real appreciation of the euro has a 
relatively modest downward effect on the euro-
area's export performance: estimates indicate 
that a 1% real effective appreciation would 
lower the level of euro-area exports by 0.25% 
after two years. Between 2001 and 2006 euro-
area exporters on the whole did well as buoyant 
world trade growth dwarfed exchange-rate 
effects. However, the export performance of 
the different Member States has been quite 
heterogeneous. These differences have little to 
do with differences in Member States' 
exposures to exchange rate fluctuations, but 
show that some countries have clearly been 
more successful than others in safeguarding 
their price and non-price competitiveness.  This 
enabled exporters of these countries to better 
seize the opportunities of a benign international 
environment and overcome the effects of a 
euro appreciation.  
From a fiscal policy perspective, we should now 
build on the premise that times are indeed 
good. Whether times are "good" or not, is 
important because – according to the reformed 
Stability and Growth Pact – structural efforts 
towards the medium-term budgetary objectives 
should be higher than the 0.5% GDP 
benchmark adjustment in good times. In 
practice, however, it is not always easy to 
identify when good times start. Painful policy 
mistakes have been made in the past, when 
policy-makers realized only after the boom that 
they had missed the opportunity to make 
progress with fiscal consolidation. Hence, when 
identifying good times it is better to be safe 
than sorry. Therefore, according to the revised 
Code of Conduct, the identification of good 
times should be based on the examination of 
overall economic conditions and take a 
forward-looking approach.  
Overall, the current economic and budgetary 
developments clearly point to a situation of 
"good times" in the euro area and in most of its 
Member States. This was explicitly recognised 
by the Eurogroup in the context of the annual 
Mid-Term Review of Budgetary developments. 
Relevant considerations were, for instance, that 
(i) the output gap is only slightly negative and 
moving towards positive territory; (ii) the labour 
market situation is improving rapidly; and (iii) 
current tax elasticities are high.  
Against this background, and as most excessive 
deficit situations have been corrected, a major 
challenge ahead is to ensure that the 
momentum of fiscal adjustment is maintained 
so as to rapidly progress towards sustainable 
fiscal positions. In this context, the Eurogroup 
issued an important statement in April 2007, 
ahead of national budgetary preparations, saying 
that 'Taking advantage of the favourable cyclical 
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conditions, most euro area members would 
achieve their MTOs in 2008 or 2009 and all of 
them should aim for 2010 at the latest'. Despite 
progress in 2006, there are, however, sources of 
concern. First, some doubts can be cast on the 
durability of the fiscal consolidation made in 
2006. While the budget deficit of the euro area 
came down substantially to 1.6% of GDP, this 
reduction was driven by large positive surprises 
in tax revenues which compensated expenditure 
overruns in some Member States. Second, some 
countries which have not yet reached their 
medium-term objectives do not plan sufficient 
fiscal efforts in 2007 and 2008.  
Fiscal consolidation is first and foremost in the 
interest of the Member States themselves. It 
creates the necessary scope for the full working 
of the automatic stabilisers in less favourable 
cyclical phases. It also allows a reduction of 
debt levels before the budgetary effects of the 
retirement of the baby boom generation set in. 
Finally, rigorous fiscal policies contribute to 
keeping interest rates low and therefore to the 
crowding-in of investment and to lower debt 
servicing costs.  
This report also stresses the importance of 
financial market integration for EMU. In 
addition to the well-documented positive effect 
of financial market developments on economic 
growth, financial integration is also critical for 
the smooth functioning of EMU. In a monetary 
union, cross-border financial flows play a 
crucial role in stabilising income and output at 
the Member State level, by expanding 
opportunities for economic agents to smooth 
consumption and investment over time. This 
stabilisation role – linked to more efficient 
resource allocation and enhanced risk-sharing 
opportunities – is very important for the euro 
area as cross-border labour mobility tends to be 
relatively limited and nominal and real wages 
tend to be sticky downwards. Therefore, euro-
area Member States have even more to gain 
from financial integration than the rest of the 
EU and we would expect these countries to be 
in the vanguard when it comes to creating an 
integrated financial market for the EU as a 
whole. 
However, while financial market integration is 
indispensable for a smooth-functioning of a 
monetary union, there are some possible 
undesirable side effects that policy-makers need 
to be prepared for. The elimination of currency 
risk and the ease of financing imbalances in 
highly integrated markets have, to some extent, 
reduced the impact of market discipline on 
national economic policies. Furthermore, deep 
and integrated financial markets tend to amplify 
both favourable events and distortions in 
national economies. In some euro-area Member 
States, the drop in risk premia and loosened 
credit constraints that have resulted from 
financial market integration and the launch of 
the euro, have been accompanied by sizeable 
losses in competitiveness and the build-up of 
persistent current-account imbalances. Hence, 
the benefits of financial integration in the 
economic adjustment process can be optimised 
only if accompanied by policies that underpin 
macroeconomic and financial stability. More 
specifically, it is important to remove structural 
rigidities and thus enhance economic flexibility, 
strengthen prudential oversight, and ensure a 
sound fiscal setting. 
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I. Economic situation in the euro area 
The latest reading of the national accounts shows that the solid economic expansion continued in the euro area in the first 
quarter of 2007. Growth was driven by strong spending on investment which accelerated further after an already very healthy 
reading in the previous quarter. Private consumption contracted slightly in the first quarter on the back of the VAT effect in 
Germany but considerably less than expected and should recover quickly as the economic expansion continues. Both business 
and consumer confidence remain at elevated levels with the latter approaching historical highs. The inflation outlook remains 
benign in the presence of anchored inflation expectations, tame imported inflation and slow progress in unit labour costs, 
although some upward risks to prices may materialise as the cycle matures. According to the Commission spring 2007 
forecast, GDP in the euro area will expand by 2.6% in 2007, an upward revision of ½ percentage point compared to the 
autumn forecast.   
The euro's appreciation since 2001 has had positive implications for euro-area prices and purchasing power but has also 
weighed on exporters' performance. The analysis shows that any change in the euro exchange rate has a large and rapid 
impact on euro-area import prices but that the knock-on effect to producer and consumer prices is more muted and slower. The 
appreciation since 2001 should bring gains in household purchasing power of about 5% in the long run. The analysis also 
suggests that fluctuations in the real exchange rate have only a relatively modest impact on export performance with a 1% 
appreciation of the REER reducing the level of extra-area exports by 0.25% after two years. Between 2001 and 2006, 
exchange rate developments curbed annual growth in extra-area exports by 0.6 pp. This is small relative to the 5% average 
annual growth in extra-area exports registered over the period and should be seen against the 0.5 pp annual fillip provided by 
exchange rate developments during the phase of euro depreciation of the second half of the 1990s. The appreciation has played 
only a limited role in the sharp differences in export performance between Member States in recent years.  
This report also revisits the link between fiscal policy and inflation. Simulations show that a fiscal expansion can have quite 
sizeable effects on inflation although results will depend on whether the expansion is based on increased expenditures or tax 
cuts. An additional dimension in the euro area is the existence of spillovers across Member States. Simulations also show 
that inflation spillovers from a fiscal expansion in one Member State to the rest of the euro area can be of a sizable 
magnitude and rather persistent for expenditure shocks in large and open countries.  
The Mid-Term Review of Budgetary policy in the euro area shows that the budgetary situation continued to improve in 2006. 
The government deficit was reduced to 1.6% of GDP and the euro area debt ratio recorded its first decline since 2002. The 
reduction of the deficit was primarily driven by large positive surprises in tax revenue which compensated expenditure overruns 
in some Member States. Now that most excessive deficit situations have been corrected, a major challenge ahead is to ensure 
that fiscal adjustment continues so as to progress towards sustainable fiscal positions. In particular, the current budgetary 
plans of some countries not yet at their medium-term objective fall short of the requirements of the SGP, which calls for 
significant consolidation efforts in economic good times.  
1. Recent economic developments and 
short-term prospects1  
Solid economic growth continues in the first 
quarter of 2007 
The vigorous economic expansion continued in 
the euro area in the first quarter of 2007. GDP 
rose 0.6% q-o-q, somewhat less than in 2006 Q4 
but still a healthy 3.0% annual rate. This is fully 
in line with the Commission’s spring 2007 
forecast. Growth in the first quarter was broad-
based across most euro-area countries. The 
                                                     
1  The cut-off date for the statistics included in this issue 
was 22 June 2007. 
momentum was impressive in Spain and Slovenia 
(1.1% and 2.2% q-o-q, respectively) and above 
average in most smaller Member States for  
which data is available. Germany and France 
were slightly below average (0.5%). Growth in 
Italy dropped after very strong Q4 (1.1%) to a 
meagre 0.3% –- which is nevertheless still a 
stronger performance than expected in the 
Commission forecast. 
Strong investment growth drives domestic 
demand 
Growth in Q1 was driven by domestic demand 
and in particular investment spending as well as 
changes in inventories. Investment went up by 
2.5% q-o-q, compared to an already strong 
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+ 1.5% in the previous quarter. This translates 
into an impressive investment growth of 7.2% 
annually. The breakdown of investment spending 
by sector is not yet available for Q1. However, 
growth of value added in the construction sector 
accelerated to +1.9% in Q1 from an already 
strong +1.5% in the previous quarter. This 
indicates that investment in Q1 continued to be 
underpinned by robust expansion in both 
construction and equipment.  
Graph 1: Contributions to real GDP growth, euro area 
(q-o-q contributions in % points –  2006 Q2 to 2007 Q1) 
-0.9
-0.4
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Ch. in inventories
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Source: Commission services. 
The available evidence suggests that the 
momentum in the construction sector is now 
primarily driven by business construction rather 
than housing. Data from Q4 shows that growth 
in non-residential construction was, at 2.6% q-o-
q, five times as high as growth in residential 
construction. Other indicators also point to some 
cooling off in the euro-area housing market. 
Growth in residential property prices is on a 
downward trend: it decelerated from close to 8% 
in 2005 to 6.4% in 2006 and showed a downward 
dynamic during the course of 2006. In turn, 
growth in mortgage lending for house purchase, 
both total lending and lending above a 5-year 
maturity, is easing – from above 12% in March 
2006 to 8.9% in March 2007.  
Equipment investment also saw impressive 
growth against a background of still-favourable 
financing conditions, sound corporate profits 
and an overall positive economic outlook. Gross 
operating surplus of corporations grew, on 
average, at a solid 4.5% per year over the 
2000-2006 period. The profit share of 
non-financial corporations (i.e. the share of 
added value created during the production 
process remunerating capital employed) soared in 
2006 Q4, rising by more than one percentage 
point. 
The strength of corporate investment is also 
visible in corporate borrowing data. The April 
reading of the ECB bank lending survey revealed 
that net demand for loans by enterprises was 
significantly positive in Q1 (although somewhat 
lower than in the previous quarter) and is 
expected to remain so in Q2. Factors behind the 
persistent high positive net demand continued to 
be dominated by corporate restructuring (M&A) 
Table 1: Euro-area growth components 
Forecast (1) 
 2006 Q2 
2006 
Q3 
2006 
Q4 
2007 
Q1 
Carryover 
to 2007 2007 (2) 2008 (2) 
 Percentage  change on previous period, volumes 
GDP 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.6 1.8 2.6 2.5 
Private consumption 0.3 0.7 0.4 -0.1 0.6 2.1 2.4 
Government consumption 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.8 1.4 1.8 1.8 
Gross fixed capital formation 2.1 1.0 1.5 2.5 4.6 4.4 3.6 
Changes in inventories (% of GDP) 0.2 0.2 -0.4 -0.9 -0.4 0.7 0.5 
Exports of goods and services 1.0 1.4 3.5 0.3 3.8 6.7 6.0 
Imports of goods and services 0.8 2.1 1.7 1.6 4.2 6.7 6.2 
 Percentage point contribution to change in GDP 
Private consumption 0.2 0.4 0.2 -0.1 0.3 1.2 1.3 
Government consumption 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.5 1.0 0.9 0.8 
Changes in inventories 0.2 0.1 -0.4 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Net exports 0.0 -0.2 0.8 0.5 -0.1 0.1 0.0 
(1) Annual change in %.         (2) European Commission spring 2007 forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
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and fixed investment – in stark contrast to the 
period before the second half of 2005 when 
corporations mainly borrowed because of 
corporate and debt restructuring and not for 
investment purposes. 
Graph 2: Business confidence indicators, euro area 
(Balance in % – Jan 2000 to May 2007) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Recent business indicators suggest that 
investment growth will remain strong in the 
second quarter. Capacity utilisation rates are at 
their highest level since 1991 and rising while 
growth in industrial new orders remains quite 
robust at more than 12% y-o-y in April. The 
latest reading of industrial production was 
disappointing, with a 0.8% month-on-month 
drop in April, but the data should be interpreted 
with caution as there were probably strong 
calendar effects. Furthermore, business 
confidence is running very high. Despite a small 
drop in May, the Business Climate Indicator 
remains close to its all time high. Moreover, the 
Reuters flash PMI points to rebound of 
confidence in June. In particular, the PMI 
showed a strong increase from 57.3 to 58.3 in the 
services' sector, a level not reached since June 
2006.   
As was predicted in the March edition of the 
QREA, enterprises replenished their stocks after 
the stark depletion registered in Q4 2006 so that 
changes in inventories contributed positively to 
Q1 growth. 
Private consumption down but set to recover 
quickly  
On a less positive note, household consumption 
dropped slightly – by 0.1% – in the first quarter 
after increasing by 0.4% in the last quarter of 
2006. This clearly reflects the impact of the VAT 
hike in January on household consumption 
growth which, in Germany, dropped by 1.4% in 
Q1. This was supplemented by a weakening of 
household consumption in Spain where quarter-
on-quarter consumption growth fell by a full 
percentage point, from 1.3% in 2006Q4 to 0.3% 
in 2007Q1. A more detailed look at the Spanish 
figures, however, reveals that the same pattern of 
a systematic slowdown in consumption in Q1 
and the usual strong consumption profile in the  
Table 2: Selected euro-area and national leading indicators, 2006-2007 
 SENT. IND1) BCI2) OECD3) PMI Man.4) PMI Ser 5) IFO6) NBB7) ZEW8)
Long-term average 101.6 0.00 92.6 52.7 54.8 96.8   -7.2 27.2 
Trough in latest 
downturn 88.1 -1.25 -0.77 42.9 46.7 87.3 -26.5 -10.4 
June 2006  108.6  1.4 108.7 57.7      60.7 104.2 10.6 37.8 
July 2006 109.7 1.3 108.7 57.4 57.9 102.6 5.6 15.1 
August 2006 108.7 1.2 108.9 56.6 57.5 101.4 3.3 -5.6 
September 2006 110.4 1.4 109.0 56.6 56.7 99.0 5.0 -22.2 
October 2006 110.9 1.4 109.3 57.0 56.5 99.3 2.4 -27.4 
November 2006 112.6 1.5 109.4 56.6 57.6 100.2 4.1 -28.5 
December 2006 112.4 1.6 109.5 56.5 57.2 102.5 2.4 -19 
January 2007 110.8 1.4 109.6 55.5 57.9 103.2 1.1 -3.6 
February 2007 112.0 1.5 109.8 55.6 57.5 102.6 0.0 2.9 
March 2007 113.8 1.5 110.0 55.4 57.4 103.2 -1.0 5.8 
April 2007 113.6 1.6 110.0 55.4 57.0 104.3 2.3 16.5 
May 2007 114.9 1.5  55.0 57.3 104.8 3.9 24.0 
June 2007    55.4* 58.3* 102.8 6.5 20.3 
1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. 2) Business climate indicator, DG ECFIN. 3) Composite leading indicator. 4) Reuters 
Purchasing Managers Index, manufacturing. 5)  Reuters Purchasing Manager Index, services. 6) Business expectations, West Germany. 7)  
National Bank of Belgium indicator for manufacturing. 8) Business expectations of financial market analysts, Germany. 
* These are flash estimates 
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Box 1: Quarterly euro-area accounts for institutional sectors 
In June 2007, for the first time, Eurostat and the European Central Bank published sector accounts for the euro area 
and EU aggregates on a quarterly basis. These statistical data show detailed economic developments by institutional 
sector: households, non-financial corporations, financial corporations and government. They also provide 
information on the interactions between these institutional sectors and the rest of the world. Moreover, quarterly 
financial balance sheets for the euro area are now available. These series cover the period from the first quarter of 
1999 to the fourth quarter of 2006. New data for each quarter should be released four months after the reference 
quarter.  
Euro-area sector accounts have been available on an annual basis for some time now but their compilation and 
dissemination by quarter will significantly improve the short-term analysis of the euro-area economy. It is now, for 
instance, possible to analyse developments in households’ gross disposable income and the contributions of the 
different components for each quarter. Growth in household disposable income picked up from the first quarter of 
2005 to the first quarter of 2006. It then remained broadly constant before decreasing slightly again in the last quarter 
of 2006, a development which appears surprising in view of the economic recovery. Growth in the households' gross 
operating surplus (mostly composed of the income of the self-employed), in contrast, accelerated steadily through 
2006. The improvement was, however, offset by weak developments in property income, higher taxes and, despite 
robust growth in employment, a significant deceleration of employees' compensation in the last quarter. The 
accounts also include useful information on the quarterly contributions of the different components of net 
entrepreneurial income of non-financial corporations. During the last quarter of 2006, the moderate growth of 
compensation of employees together with a higher growth of the net value added contributed to a surge in net 
entrepreneurial income.  
Other key indicators such as the household saving rate, the business investment rate and the business profit share are 
also available in these accounts.  
 
Contribution of components to the growth of 
gross disposable income of households, euro 
area (1) (y-o-y changes in %) 
Contribution of components to the growth of net 
entrepreneurial income of non-financial 
corporations, euro area (y-o-y changes in %) 
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(1) This includes households and Non-Profit Institutions Serving 
Households (NPISH) 
Source: Commission services, ECB. 
Source: Commission services, ECB. 
 
It should be noted that, with a few exceptions, the series are neither seasonally nor working-day adjusted.  
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remaining three quarters had also been recorded 
in previous years, so that the deceleration in 
consumption in Q1 should be interpreted with 
prudence. Overall, the mild contraction in private 
consumption in the euro area in the first quarter 
is likely to reflect mostly temporary factors, so 
that household spending can be expected to 
regain momentum in the next few quarters. 
Graph 3: Household saving rate and y-o-y consumption 
growth, euro area (in % – 1999 Q1 to 2007 Q1) 
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Source: Commission services. 
One element which should support household 
spending in the next months is strong consumer 
confidence. After having been on a steady 
upward path since mid-2005 and, having 
increased even more steeply since spring 2007, 
consumer confidence is now rapidly approaching 
an all-time high. The most pronounced 
improvement in consumer confidence from April 
to May was recorded in France – possibly a 
reaction to the presidential elections. The 
positive outlook for consumer spending also 
continues to be supported by the very positive 
developments on the labour market. 
Unemployment receded further to 7.1% in April, 
almost a full percentage point lower than a year 
earlier, and employment growth continued to 
expand robustly, by 0.4% q-o-q in Q1. 
Consumers’ unemployment expectations for the 
next 12 months improved further in the spring, 
while business employment expectations 
improved moderately in the manufacturing 
industry and significantly in the services sector. 
Thus both consumers and producers expect the 
labour market to continue to brighten further.  
The main factor which has been weighing on 
consumer spending in recent quarters is sluggish 
disposable income. Despite clear signs of 
economic recovery, y-o-y growth in nominal 
disposable income failed to accelerate in 2006 
and even decelerated, from 3.3% to 2.8%, during 
the second half of the year (no data are yet 
available for the first quarter of 2007). This was 
mostly attributable to a decrease in the 
contribution of employees' compensation to the 
growth of disposable income, which fell from 
3.0% to 2.2% despite robust employment growth 
(see Box 1). The lower-than-expected increase in 
disposable income was not compensated by a 
reduction in the savings ratio, which has instead 
remained broadly stable since mid-2005 (Graph 
3). As the recovery unfolds and employment 
growth continues, disposable income should 
strengthen in the coming quarters, particularly as 
non-labour income continues to pick up. The 
effect on consumption could be reinforced by a 
drop in precautionary savings, although 
developments observed since 2005 do not give 
much ground for optimism in this regard.  
Graph 4: Consumer confidence, euro area 
(Balance in % – Jan 2000 to May 2007) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The international environment stays 
supportive, but showed some signs of 
cooling off in Q1  
Euro-area trade growth decelerated significantly 
in Q1 with exports rising by a meagre 0.3%, after 
an impressive 3.5% in Q4. Import growth stayed 
broadly stable compared to the previous quarter, 
but because of the drop in export growth, net 
exports contributed negatively to growth in Q1.  
Once again, developments in Germany left their 
trace in the overall euro-area figure. German 
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exports in Q1 receded (-1.2%) after a very strong 
Q4 (+6.0%). However,  as the German 2006 Q4 
figure had been inflated by statistical effects – 
many exports effected earlier in 2006 entered the 
foreign trade statistics only in 2006 Q4 – a 
correction was to be expected.  
Graph 5: Growth in global trade 
(y-o-y in % –  2001 Q1 to  2007 Q1) 
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Source: CPB, Commission's calculations. 
In addition to statistical effects, the lower figure 
for exports may also reflect a slight cooling-off 
of the international environment. According to 
the latest estimates of the CPB Netherlands 
Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, world 
trade still rose at a solid 7.7% (y-o-y)  in Q1, but 
this is not quite as strong as the figure in 
previous quarters. Other indicators, however, 
suggest that the softening of the world economy 
remains, at this juncture, rather moderate. The 
global PMI started sluggishly at the beginning of 
Q1 but recovered later on in the quarter. It was 
led by stronger trends in production, new orders 
and employment. This more positive 
development is set to continue in the second 
quarter of this year as the April PMI started on a 
brighter note than in the first quarter. In a similar 
vein, the April reading of the quarterly World 
Economic Survey (WES) also pointed to a slight 
weakening of current global economic 
developments. Nevertheless, the survey's 
expectations for the following six months 
improved slightly in the last two quarters. Finally, 
export expectations for the months ahead, as 
recorded in the Commission's manufacturing 
survey, have weakened somewhat since the end 
of last year but remain very high by historical 
standards.  
One factor which may be weighing somewhat on 
the euro area's export performance is the 
appreciation of the euro. In real effective terms, 
the euro has appreciated by about 5% since the 
beginning of 2006. In the Commission's business 
surveys, manufacturers have reported a 
deterioration of their competitive position 
outside the EU since the middle of last year. The 
impact of the euro appreciation should, however, 
not be overestimated. Manufacturers' perceived 
competitiveness still remains at its long-term 
average and the recent relapse in the indicator 
partly marks a correction to a sharp 
improvement between early 2005 and mid-2006. 
Furthermore, econometric analysis shows that 
euro-area exports are not very sensitive to 
exchange rate movements (see Section 2 of this 
report on the impact of the euro appreciation on 
domestic prices and exports).  
At this juncture, the major element of uncertainty 
for the global outlook is the situation in the US. 
After four quarters of below-potential growth, 
the US economy seems to have reaccelerated in 
2007 Q2 helped by an upturn in the inventory 
cycle and improving net exports. The ISM 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing indices 
reached the highest level of the year in May and 
consumer spending has shown surprising 
resilience. The unemployment rate has remained 
close to 4.5%. However, the correction in the 
housing market continues and is likely to dampen 
growth further. Spillovers to other parts of the 
economy, so far largely absent, may yet 
materialise. 
Impact of the VAT hike on inflation rather 
moderate 
Euro-area HICP inflation stood at an annual 
1.9% in May, thus broadly stable since 
November 2006. Services continued to make the 
highest contribution to inflation, being 
responsible for a good half of the overall rise in 
the HICP. Thanks to favourable base effects, 
energy – despite the recent rebound in crude oil 
prices – did not contribute much to inflation in 
the first months of 2007. Benign developments 
in the prices of energy and unprocessed food 
have left headline and core inflation running at 
broadly the same pace since the beginning of the 
year. 
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Graph 6: Contributions to headline inflation, euro area  
(y-o-y changes in % - Jan 2006 to May 2007) 
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Source: Commission services. 
An analysis of the drivers of inflation shows that 
the renewed appreciation of the euro since 2006 
has kept a lid on imported inflation (see 
Section 2 for further discussion). Wage inflation 
has also remained tame so far. Unit labour cost 
growth decelerated sharply during the second 
half of 2006, with y-o-y growth falling to zero in 
the fourth quarter on the back of further wage 
moderation and a rebound in productivity. 
Eurostat's hourly labour cost indicator suggests 
that wage growth remained modest in the first 
quarter of 2007.  
Graph 7: Unit labour costs, labour productivity and 
wages, euro area  
(y-o-y changes in % – 2000 Q1 to 2006 Q4) 
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Source: Commission services. 
In May, inflation was above the euro-area 
average in Ireland, Greece, Spain and Slovenia 
and significantly below the average in Belgium, 
France and Finland. Due to the VAT hike in 
January, German annual HICP inflation went up 
by about half a percentage point from the 
December figure of 1.4% and stabilised around 
2.0% in the period January – May 2007. Hence, 
the impact of the VAT hike on the overall price 
level has been rather moderate.  
Short-term outlook and risks 
Inflation expectations are overall consistent with 
benign inflation developments in the future. The 
indicator measuring households' price 
expectations for the next twelve months in the 
Commission's Consumer Survey has decreased 
significantly since the beginning of the year. On 
the corporate side, managers' expectations 
regarding price pressures have remained broadly 
stable in recent months, both in industry (based 
on the Commission's Business Survey) and in the 
service sector (based on the PMI survey). In the 
short run, benign inflation expectations 
combined with tame imported inflation and slow 
progress in unit labour costs should help contain 
price pressures in the euro area. According to the 
Commission's spring 2007 forecast, overall 
inflation should remain moderate, averaging 
1.9% for 2007 as a whole.  
Nevertheless, as the business cycle matures, 
upward risks to prices will increase. The 
advanced cyclical position in many euro-area 
economies could finally translate into upward 
pressures on wages. Wage growth has, so far, 
been moderate within the euro area as a whole, 
but the low euro-area average conceals distinct 
differences at the country level2, so that once the 
benign wage developments in e.g. Germany and 
Austria come to an end, the picture in the euro 
area as a whole is also likely to deteriorate. 
Moreover, labour shortages are likely to become 
more acute as the cycle matures and as the 
underlying trend of robust employment growth 
persists with more than 5 million jobs projected 
to be created over the 2007-2008 period. 
Overall, economic prospects for the euro area 
remain bright. The Commission's spring 2007 
forecast expects GDP to grow by 2.6% in 2007, 
an upward revision of ½ percentage point 
compared to the autumn forecast. Domestic 
demand is expected to be the main driver of 
                                                     
2  See, for example, the analysis in the Quarterly Report on 
the Euro Area, Volume 6 No. 1 (2007). 
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growth, on the basis of solid investment growth. 
Private consumption is – at last – projected to 
accelerate. Exports, while still developing 
positively, are expected to contribute less to the 
expansion than previously. Oil prices are 
projected to stay high and financing conditions, 
while continuing to be supportive to growth, will 
be less so than in previous years.  
Risks seem to be broadly balanced for 2007 – 
with upside risks for domestic demand which 
could prove stronger than projected. On the 
downside, a more pronounced slowdown in the 
US could weigh on the euro area's economic 
development. Although it now seems more likely 
that the US will see only a limited slowdown, it 
still remains to be seen how deep the downturn 
on the housing market really will be. Moreover, a 
sharper-than-expected US slowdown could be a 
catalyst for an abrupt unwinding of financial 
imbalances globally which would in turn weigh 
on the euro area. In some Member States a 
sharper slowdown of housing investment could 
materialise, although current signs point to a 
gradual cooling-off on the Irish and Spanish 
housing markets.  Finally, oil prices have been on 
the rise recently and, if geopolitical tensions 
intensify, they could again become a source of 
downside risks to growth. 
Monetary and financial conditions  
On 6 June 2007, the ECB Governing Council 
raised its policy interest rates by 25 basis points. 
Since December 2005, the ECB's key interest 
rate has been raised by a total of 200 basis points, 
from 2% to currently 4%. The ECB decisions to 
hike interest rates were motivated by upside risks 
to price stability, identified by the Governing 
Council through both its economic and monetary 
analyses, and should anchor medium- to longer-
term inflation expectations in the euro area at 
levels consistent with price stability.  
Driven by the strong growth momentum of the 
euro area and statements by members of the 
ECB Governing Council, financial market 
participants have gradually increased their 
expectations of further rate hikes. While market 
expectations in March, as derived from future 
contracts, had priced in an end to the current rate 
hiking cycle at 4 percent, a policy rate of 4.5 
percent is now expected by the first half of 2008.  
Graph 8: ECB minimum bid rate and 3-month 
EURIBOR (in % – 4 Jan 99 to 22 June 07) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The changes in policy interest rate expectations 
have been reflected in long-term interest rate 
developments in the euro area. Since end-March, 
10-year-government-bond yields in the euro area 
have increased by around 50 basis points, and at 
the end of June, long-term interest rates were 
standing at 4.6%, their highest level since 
October 2002. 
Graph 9: 10-year government bond yields 
(in % – 2 Jan 06 to 22 June 07) 
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Source: Commission services. 
In the US, the increase in 10-year-government-
bond yields was less pronounced than in the euro 
area between the end of March and mid-May, 
when concerns about the growth outlook and 
speculation on Fed rate cuts dominated financial 
markets. At that time, developments in 
government bond markets were seen as reflecting 
the ongoing gradual decoupling between the US 
and euro-area economy. However, since the May 
meeting of the FOMC, when the policy rate was 
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left unchanged, bond markets have experienced a 
significant sell-off, bringing US bond yields to 
their highest level since May 2002. The sell-off 
seems to be mainly triggered by changed market 
perceptions of the US economic outlook, driven 
by indications of improved economic prospects. 
Earlier market expectations about possible Fed 
rate cuts faded away and some analysts even 
started to speculate on possible rate hikes. While 
the recent increase in bond yields seems to be 
fully explainable by macro-economic factors, 
some commentators have linked it to a receding 
of global liquidity and a possible repatriation of 
Asian funds and a shift into euro.   
Graph 10: USD/EUR exchange rates and interest rate 
differential (1 Jan 06 to 22 June 07) 
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Source: Commission services. 
As far as exchange rate developments are 
concerned, the new appreciation of the euro 
exchange rate against the US dollar since the 
beginning of the year, which led to a new record 
high in late April of USD/EUR 1.365, came to a 
(temporary) halt in May. Since early May, the 
bilateral exchange rate has fluctuated within a 
narrow margin around a level of USD/EUR 
1.34. Movements in the bilateral exchange rate, 
similar to bond market developments, can be 
mainly explained by interest rate expectations 
and differences in the assessment of the 
economic outlook. Since mid-May, financial 
markets appear to have been giving the prospects 
of a soft landing in the US at least the same 
weight as the prospect of the ECB raising rates 
to 4.5%. 
Graph 11: Euro-area MCI and its contributors 
(Index Jan 1999=100 – Inverted scale – Jan 99 to May 07) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Overall, increasing interest rates and an 
appreciating currency have led to some further 
tightening of monetary conditions in the euro 
area as measured by ECFIN's Monetary 
Conditions Index (MCI). 
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2. The impact of the euro appreciation 
on domestic prices and the export 
performance  
Following a sizeable depreciation from 1996 till 
2000, the euro has been on an appreciating trend 
since 2000 and has clearly recovered the ground 
previously lost. While in nominal effective terms 
the appreciation might appear to be sizeable, the 
appreciation in real effective terms was less 
pronounced. This section assesses the effects of 
the appreciation on household purchasing power 
and on euro-area trade. These are the two most 
direct, though by no means the only, channels 
through which exchange-rate fluctuations may 
affect economic growth. For instance, an 
appreciating currency may also impact financial 
markets (by changing the relative attractiveness 
of domestic and foreign assets), corporate 
balance sheets (by reducing the value of 
companies' foreign financial and non-financial 
assets) and monetary policy (by reducing 
imported inflation). Unfortunately, the latter 
channels do not lend themselves easily to 
quantification and will not be discussed further 
here.  
2.1. The euro appreciation in historical 
perspective 
Graph 12 shows various measures of the 
nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) and real 
effective exchange rate (REER) of the euro over 
a long-term horizon.  
Graph 12: Nominal effective and real effective exchange 
rates of the euro   (1999=100) 
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Source: Commission services. 
There has been a clear upward trend in nominal 
effective terms since 1970. The trend was 
interrupted by two periods of noticeable 
depreciations in 1980-1985 and 1996-2000. After 
both episodes the euro rapidly appreciated and 
returned to trend.  
The trend appreciation of the nominal exchange 
rate has not been reflected in measures of the 
real exchange rate. Owing to a favourable 
inflation differential between the euro area and 
its trading partners, measures of the real 
exchange rates based on the GDP deflator or 
unit labour cost do not show any long-term trend 
over the past three decades. However, short-run 
fluctuations in the external nominal value of the 
euro have an impact on euro-area price and cost 
competitiveness as shown by the two episodes of 
large swings in the nominal exchange rate in the 
early 1990s and late 1990s-early 2000s.  
Table 3 presents the developments of NEER and 
REER for the latest periods of depreciation 
(1996-00) and appreciation (2001-06). In real 
terms, the appreciation since 2001 has not fully 
offset the depreciation registered between 1996 
and 2000, with the result that REER measures 
are still currently below their previous peak in the 
mid-1990s. Furthermore, depending on the 
deflator chosen, the current level of the real 
effective exchange rate is 4.5% above its long-
term average, (when measured by the GDP 
deflator) or almost 2% below the average (when 
unit labour costs are used). This suggests that the 
current level of real exchange rates is not 
particularly high by historical standards. 
Table 3: Nominal and real effective exchange 
rates, euro area  
 
% change over the 
period 
Current level 
compared to long-
term average (%) 
(1) 
 
1996-
2000 
2001-
2006  
NEER -14.2 21.4 31.7 
REER 
ULC 
-25.8 17.5 -1.8 
REER 
GDP 
-22.3 16.3 4.5 
(1) Long-term average is the 1970-2006 average. 
Source: Commission services. 
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2.2. The euro appreciation and domestic 
purchasing power 
This section examines the extent of the pass-
through of the euro appreciation into domestic 
prices via its effect on imported inflation and 
consumer price inflation. It first looks at the 
extent of exchange rate pass-through in the euro 
area as a whole and then discusses the main 
reasons for its variation across products, Member 
States and time. Box 2 presents some results of 
an econometric examination of exchange-rate 
pass-through at the euro-area level. 
Exchange rate pass-through to import prices  
Empirical evidence shows that the pass-through 
of exchange-rate changes to import prices in the 
euro area is large and fairly rapid. This can be 
seen by looking at Graph 13, which charts the 
development of unit values for import prices and 
the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) in 
percentage changes for the euro area since 
January 2001. The graph shows a strong negative 
correlation between the two series. Over the 
period January to December 2006, for example, 
while the y-o-y percentage change in the NEER 
rose from -5% to 5%, import price inflation fell 
from 7% to 0%. This indicates a pass-through 
rate for this period of about 70%. 
Graph 13: Unit values for imports and NEER, euro area 
 (y-o-y % of change, Jan 2001 to April 2007) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Box 2 reports the results of a simple econometric 
investigation into the pass-through of exchange 
rate changes to import prices, as well as to 
producer and consumer prices, in the euro area. 
Results for the period January 1997 to February 
2007 show that an average pass-through rate to 
import prices of about 25% can be estimated in 
the short run. In the long run, this increases to 
69%. This is comparable to empirical estimates 
found in the academic literature, which generally 
finds pass-through rates of 50 to 70%. 
The impact on producer and consumer 
prices 
Evidence shows that the exchange rate pass-
through to producer and consumer prices is 
smaller and significantly slower than that to 
import prices. Graphs 14 and 15 show the 
development of producer prices and consumer 
prices (HICP excluding energy and unprocessed 
food) against the NEER over the period January 
2001 to April 2007. It is hard to see a relationship 
between these variables from visual observation. 
However, results from the econometric 
investigation (Box 2) show there is a statistically 
significant relationship. For producer prices, the 
short-run exchange rate pass-through effect is 
about 1%, increasing to about 23% in the long 
run, while for consumer prices the short-run 
effect is about 1%, increasing to 19% in the long 
run. Thus, the further along the chain of 
distribution, the slower and more muted the 
pass-through. 
Graph 14: Producer prices and NEER, euro area 
 (y-o-y % of change, Jan 2001 to April 2007) 
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Source: Commission services. 
In terms of household purchasing power, the 
effect of exchange rate fluctuations can be 
significant. Based on the equation in Box 2, the 
appreciation of the euro since 2001 should entail 
a long-term cumulated gain in purchasing power 
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of about 5%, with some of these benefits still to 
materialise due to the long lags involved.3 
Graph 15: Consumer prices and NEER, euro area 
 (y-o-y % of change, Jan 2001 to April 2007) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Exchange rate pass-through variation and its 
causes 
Exchange rate pass-through varies across a 
number of dimensions (products, countries, and 
time), due to both macro- and microeconomic 
factors. Macroeconomic factors include such 
things as the prevailing economic situation, the 
policy environment and credibility of monetary 
policy, while micro factors include industry-
specific market structure and product 
characteristics. In addition, pass-through is 
affected by whether the shock is permanent or 
temporary as well as the extent and composition 
of trade between countries. 
Evidence shows that pass-through varies 
substantially across products. A recent CEPII 
working paper studies the extent and sources of 
varying pass-through rates across products.4 The 
paper uses a highly disaggregated database to 
study the product dimension, through the 
estimation of 'pricing-to-market' coefficients.5 
                                                     
3  The figure is calculated by multiplying the 19% long-term 
elasticity estimated in Box 2 by the size of the nominal 
appreciation since 2001 (about 25% based on annual 
averages). 
4  Gaulier, G. et al. (2006), 'Structural Determinants of the 
Exchange-Rate Pass-Through', CEPII Working Paper No 
2006-03, (February). 
5  In pricing-to-market foreign producers and intermediaries 
adjust their profit margins to keep their selling price in 
line with those of their domestic competitors. 
Results show that on average 11.5% of a 
currency shock is absorbed into foreign 
companies' mark-ups during the year following 
an exchange rate change. However, this hides 
considerable heterogeneity across products. The 
paper identifies a number of structural 
determinants of this heterogeneity. Firstly, 
pricing-to-market is found to be stronger when 
goods are traded on referenced markets, 
presumably because referencing eases arbitrage 
and forces firms to keep their prices in line with 
prices on the import market. Secondly, pricing-
to-market is stronger for final consumption 
goods, probably due to higher competitive 
pressures in those markets. Finally, pricing-to-
market is found to be lower in smaller or more 
concentrated markets, where the risk of demand 
is less pronounced, and when exporters hold a 
large market share. 
Pass-through also varies across countries. 
Previous analysis has shown, for example, that 
for import prices short-run pass-through rates 
vary between almost 80% for some countries, 
such as Finland and Italy, and less than 40% for 
others, such as Greece, Ireland, and Austria.6 
Exchange rate pass-through variation across 
countries can largely be attributed to divergences 
in the degree of openness to extra-euro-area 
imports.  
Finally, evidence shows that pass-through rates 
have significantly declined across the board over 
the past few years.7 This decline is generally 
attributed to the emergence of a low and stable 
inflation environment as well as a rise in import 
penetration.8 
                                                     
6  See Campa, J.M. and J.M. González (2002), 'Differences 
in exchange rate pass-through in the euro area', Banco de 
España, Servicio de Estudios, Documento de Trabajo No 
0219, (July). 
7  See for example Sekine, T. (2006), 'Time-varying 
exchange rate pass-through: experiences of some 
industrial countries', BIS Working paper, No 202 (March). 
8  In the case of imports, the result is purely empirical as 
economic theory is agnostic about the sign of the effect 
of increased imports penetration on the pass-though. It 
may be interpreted as evidence that the pass-through is 
lower in more competititive markets.  
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Box 2: An econometric investigation of exchange rate pass-through in the euro area 
This box presents the results of a simple econometric investigation into exchange rate pass-through in the euro area. 
The data used are monthly values for import prices (unit values for imports), producer prices for consumer goods, 
consumer prices (HICP excluding energy and unprocessed food ), oil prices and the NEER for the euro area versus 
IC36, all measured in annual rates of change, for the period January 1997 to February 2007. Results are presented in 
the table below. 
For import prices, the model with the best fit was for unit values for imports on its own first-order lagged values, as 
well as that for the NEER. Initially, lagged oil price inflation was included as an explanatory variable, but this was 
found to be insignificant. The results for this model show that these two variables can explain 92% of the variation 
in euro area import prices. They also show that, in the short run, an exchange rate pass-through effect of about 25% 
can be estimated, increasing to 69% in the long run.1 For producer prices, the model with the best fit included the 
first-order lag of producer prices and the NEER lagged 4 periods. The estimated exchange rate pass-through effect 
was just over 1% in the short run and about 23% in the long run. Finally, for consumer prices, best fit is achieved by 
including lagged consumer prices and the NEER lagged 13 periods. The short run pass-through effect at 13 months 
is less than 1%. In the long run it is 19%.  
In conclusion, it can be said that the analysis contained herein confirms the basic results achieved in the academic 
literature that exchange rate pass-through is relatively strong and rapid for import prices but becomes slower and 
more muted along the distribution chain. Obviously, the analysis here is limited. Further work could expand the 
analysis along a number of lines. Firstly, a more sophisticated model could be used. Secondly, one could look at the 
country dimension. Thirdly, the pass-through to different price indices could be analysed. Finally, one could also 
allow for time-varying coefficients. 
 
Exchange rate pass-through in the euro area 
(1) Pass-through to import prices 
Constant 0.999*** 
Unit values for imports (-1) 0.643*** 
NEER(-1)  -0.246*** 
Adj-R2 0.926 
(2) Pass-through to producer prices 
Constant 0.066** 
Producer prices (-1) 0.960*** 
NEER (-4) -0.009*** 
Adj-R2 0.955 
(2) Pass-through to consumer prices 
Constant 0.054 
Consumer prices (-1) -0.974*** 
NEER (-13) -0.005*** 
Adj-R2 0.934 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Source: Commission services. 
1 Long run rates of pass-through are calculated as 
0
1
1 α
α
− , where α1 is the coefficient estimate on the lagged exchange rate 
variable and α0 is the coefficient on the first-order lagged dependent variable. 
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2.3. The euro appreciation and trade 
performance  
The euro appreciation has taken only a 
modest toll on aggregate euro-area exports 
While economic theory suggests that exchange 
rate fluctuations should have an impact on the 
export performance, the magnitude of this effect 
depends on a range of factors related, inter alia, 
to the sectoral composition and quality structure 
of exports.  
To assess the overall sensitivity of euro-area 
exports to changes in the euro exchange rate, an 
export equation was estimated (see Box 3). The 
equation relates extra-area exports to world 
demand and the real exchange rate. Estimation 
results suggest that fluctuations in the real 
exchange rate feed through into the export 
performance relatively rapidly. However, the 
corresponding elasticity is low. A 1% 
appreciation of the real exchange rate reduces the 
level of extra-area exports by 0.2% after one year 
and about 0.25% after two years with no further 
significant additional impact afterwards.  
The equation can be simulated to assess the 
contribution of the various determinants to 
export growth. These contributions are displayed 
in Table 4 for the latest periods of broad 
depreciation (1996-00) and appreciation of the 
euro (2001-06). The contribution of the real 
exchange rate was fairly symmetric over the two 
periods, adding 0.5% to annual export growth in 
the second half of the 1990s and shaving off 
0.6% of annual growth over 2001-06 (equivalent 
to slightly above 0.1% in terms of euro-area 
GDP, other things being equal).9 In the latter 
case, most of the negative effect on growth was 
felt in 2003 and 2004. For both periods, the 
effect of the real exchange rate was dwarfed by 
the much larger effect of world demand.  
                                                     
9  The average effect of the REER over 2001-06 includes 
some positive effects from the depreciation in the late 
1990s that were still being felt in 2001 and early 2002. 
Excluding these lagged effects, the impact of the 
appreciation of the euro since 2001 was somewhat higher, 
averaging about 0.8% annually instead of 0.6% for the 
2001-06 period. 
Table 4: Sources of growth in extra-area exports, 
euro area (average annual growth in %) (1) 
 1996-00 2001-06 
Extra-area exports (actual) 7.7 5.4 
Extra-area exports (simulated)  
      of which: 
8.4 5.0 
      REER (2) 0.5 -0.6 
      World trade (2) 8.3 5.9 
      Other  (2) -0.4 -0.4 
Unexplained -0.6 0.4 
(1) The contributions are based on the estimated export equation 
presented in Box 3. 
(2) The contribution of a variable takes into account lagged effects 
of this variable. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Fluctuations in the euro exchange rate can also 
affect import demand via two channels. By 
raising households' purchasing power, an 
exchange rate appreciation will foster private 
consumption and import demand (in other 
words some of the benefits identified in the 
previous section will leak into imports). The 
appreciation will also encourage substitution 
from domestic products towards cheaper 
imports.10 However, econometric analysis 
presented in Box 3 suggests that the latter effect 
is small and the relation of import prices to 
domestic prices is not a major determinant of 
import growth.  
Large differences in Member States' extra-
area export performance… 
This section takes a disaggregated approach and 
looks into the export performance of individual 
euro-area Member States in order to examine 
further the effects of the euro's appreciation. 
Graph 16 shows extra-area export growth in 
selected euro-area countries. There are significant 
differences among Member States. Whereas 
Italy’s and Ireland's extra-area exports have been 
almost flat since 2000, Austria's and Germany's 
export volumes have increased by 50 - 60%. The 
difference in export performance between the 
two ends of the spectrum has become 
particularly pronounced since 2003. The rest of 
                                                     
10  Some of these cheaper imports will also be used as inputs 
in the production process and result in improved price 
competitiveness for exporters.  
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Box 3: Estimating export and import equations for the euro area 
 
This box presents an update of an estimated export equation first described in an earlier issue of the Quarterly 
Report on the Euro Area(*) and adds some information on the estimation of an import equation.  
 
A major shortcoming of euro-area trade data in quarterly national accounts (QNAs) is that they cover both intra-area 
and extra-area trade flows. Hence, export and import fluctuations in QNAs reflect both changes in external variables 
(competitiveness and world demand) and changes in euro-area domestic demand (intra-area trade). To overcome this 
limitation, an extra-area exports and an extra-area import series were constructed by applying the share of extra-area 
exports (imports) in total exports (imports) of goods (as obtained from Eurostat's trade data) to total euro-area 
exports (imports) of goods and services (as obtained from the QNAs). The resulting series are not without their own 
shortcomings (in particular, they tend to be significantly more volatile than the series of the QNA) but they yield a 
better fit in estimated equations.  
 
The estimated export equation is presented in the table below. It is specified as an error correction mechanism. A 
cointegration relation between exports, world demand and the REER was identified with Johansen's maximum 
likelihood method (see left part of the table). Several measures of the real effective exchange rate (REER) were 
tested with the best fit obtained with the REER based on export prices. The real exchange rate only enters the long-
run equation but, given the relatively large size of the coefficient on the error correction term in the short-term 
dynamics, exchange-rate fluctuations affect exports relatively rapidly (most of the effect of an exchange-rate shock is 
reflected in the export performance after three quarters). The response of exports to changes in the external value of 
the euro is relatively muted: a 1% appreciation of the real exchange rate leads to a 0.2% drop in the level of extra-
area exports compared to the baseline after one year and a 0.25% drop after two years.  
 
Estimated export  equation for  the euro area 
(1989:1-2006:4) 
Long-term equation  
Endogenous variable: Log(exports of goods and services) 
Short-term dynamics  
Endogenous variable: ∆Log(exports of goods and services) (3) 
Variable Euro area Variable Euro area 
Log(REER) (1)  -0.282 ∆Log(World demand) 0.846 
Log(World demand) (2)  1.000 Error-correction term -0.386 
Linear trend 0.000925 Constant 2.457 
  R_squared 0.54 
(1) REER based on export prices. (2) World trade is based on data from the OECD and the CPB. Long-term coefficient is constrained to 1.  
(3) All coefficients meaningful at the 1% level. 
Source: Commission services 
 
Estimated import equation for the  
euro area (1989:1-2006:3) 
Endogenous variable: ∆Log (extra-area imports) 
Variable Euro area (2) 
∆Log(domestic demand) 1.873 * 
∆Log(extra-area exports) 0.533 * 
∆Log(RIP-5)) (1) 0.120 ** 
R_squared 0.50 
(1) Relative import prices defined as the ratio of extra-
area unit value index for imports to the GDP deflator. 
(2) * and ** denote significance at the 1% and 10% 
levels respectively.  
Source: Commission services 
The estimated import equation is presented in the adjacent table. It 
relates extra-area imports to the domestic demand, exports and a 
relative price term (the ratio of the unit value index for extra-area 
imports to the GDP deflator). No meaningful cointegration relation 
could be identified and the equation was estimated in first 
differences. The estimated coefficient on the price term comes with 
the correct sign but with a borderline significance (at the 10% level 
only) and should therefore be interpreted with prudence. According 
to the estimated coefficient, a 10% decrease in the relative price 
entails a 1.2% fall of imports. The corresponding elasticity to the 
real exchange rate should, however, be lower. Firstly, the analysis in 
section 2.2 showed that the pass-through of exchange-rate changes 
to unit values is less than unity (about 70% in the long run). 
Secondly, changes in the real exchange rate are also likely to affect 
domestic prices used as the denominator of the  
relative price term. Both effects should play in the same direction, suggesting that a 10% real appreciation will entail 
a 5-6% drop in the relative price term and a 0.6-0.7% drop in extra-area imports. The exchange rate elasticity of 
imports is therefore likely to be considerably lower than in the case of exports (but of course this only covers import 
substitution effects and not indirect income effects due to increased purchasing power which are captured via the 
domestic demand term of the equation). 
(*) Focus on "The impact of the euro appreciation on economic activity", Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 3 No.1 (2004). 
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the euro-area Member States fall somewhere in 
between.11 
Graph 16: Extra-area export performance of selected 
euro-area Member States (volume indices 2000=100) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Graph 17 compares Member States' intra- and 
extra-area export performance. It plots export 
growth to the euro area (horizontal axis) and 
outside the euro area (vertical axis) over the 
2001-06 period. The upward sloping line depicts 
equal change in extra- and intra-euro area 
exports. Countries located above the line 
recorded larger extra-area export growth than 
intra-area export growth over the period 
considered. It is noteworthy that in spite of the 
euro appreciation, extra-euro-area export growth 
was larger than intra-euro-area export growth in 
more than half of the Member States.  
Another interesting feature of the chart is that it 
shows a clear correlation between intra- and 
extra-area export growth. Countries that 
performed well in terms of extra-area trade 
tended to perform well also within the euro area. 
Similarly, countries with weak intra-area export 
growth also recorded weak extra-area export 
growth. This suggests that differences in Member 
States' exposure to the fluctuations of the euro 
(which only affects extra-area exports) are not 
the main reason behind the different export 
                                                     
11  Data on intra- and extra-area exports presented in this 
section are based on National Accounts' export of goods. 
The breakdown into intra- and extra-area exports was 
calculated using intra-extra shares derived from Eurostat's 
External Trade Statistics. External Trade Statistics are 
compiled from Customs and Intrastat declarations and 
can sometimes diverge substantially from national 
accounts data, in particular due to differences in the 
treatment of transit trade.  
performance, an issue which is discussed in more 
details in the next paragraph.  
Graph 17: Intra- and extra area export growth, euro-
area Member States (volumes, 2001-2006, in %) 
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Source: Commission services. 
… are difficult to relate to differences in 
Member States' exposure to euro 
fluctuations… 
There have been significant differences in 
Member States' exposure to the appreciation of 
the euro since 2001. Graph 18 shows the change 
of nominal effective exchange rates (NEER) of 
euro-area Member States over the period 2001-
2006. Nominal effective appreciation of the 
individual Member States was more contained 
than that of the euro area as a whole. The 
difference comes from the fact that, contrary to 
the NEER for the euro area a whole, the NEER 
for individual countries covers both extra-euro-
area trade (exposed to currency fluctuations) and 
intra-euro-area trade (not exposed to currency 
fluctuations). The NEER appreciation at the 
country level ranged from just above 5% in 
Austria to 12% in the case of Ireland. 
However, differences in the exposure to euro 
appreciation seem to have made only a modest 
contribution to differences in Member States' 
extra-area export performance. Since 2001, 
changes in competitiveness at the Member State 
level have indeed been primarily determined by 
developments in domestic cost conditions, with 
exposure to the euro fluctuations playing only a 
relatively modest role. This can be seen in 
Graph 19 which compares changes in the NEER 
and the REER over 2001-2006 across euro-area 
Member States. The relationship between the 
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two variables is weak. Over the period 
considered, the NEER appreciated by 5% to 
12%, depending on the Member State 
considered. In the meantime, the range of 
changes in competitiveness was much larger at 
about 0 to 22%. Countries with similar exposure 
to nominal exchange rate fluctuations recorded 
very different developments in terms of 
competitiveness. On the other hand, countries 
that faced comparable levels of real appreciation 
witnessed different magnitudes of nominal 
exchange-rate changes. 
Graph 18: Changes in nominal effective exchange rates, 
euro-area Member States (2001-2006, in %) 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
IE IT DE FI FR EL ES BE NL PT AT  
Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph 19: Real and nominal effective exchange rate 
changes 2001-2006 (1) 
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(1) REER based on the export price deflator.  
Source: Commission services. 
More formally, the cross-country variance of 
changes in the REER can be decomposed into its 
NEER component and a price/cost component. 
Over 2001-06, the decomposition shows that less 
than 15% of Member States' differences in 
REER can be related to differences in the NEER 
(i.e. differences in the exposure to the euro 
fluctuations).  
The analysis above shows that differences in 
Member States' exposure to fluctuations in the 
euro only play a modest role in explaining 
Member States' differences in price/cost 
competitiveness and thereby differences in 
export performance since the beginning of the 
decade. In addition, it should be noted that 
price/cost competitiveness is not the only 
determinant of export performance (in Graph 19 
this factor explains less than 60% of the 
differences in Member States' export growth). 
Other factors that have contributed to the 
observed heterogeneity in export performance 
include the sectoral and geographical 
composition of exports as well as non-price 
competitiveness (e.g. quality improvements and 
technological advances).12  
… so are the changes in profit margins  
When faced with a currency appreciation, 
domestic exporters can reduce their profit 
margins in order to avoid excessive rises in their 
prices on foreign markets and protect their 
market shares.  
To check the relation between profit margins and 
the recent euro appreciation, Graph 20 plots 
changes in profit margins for each Member 
State's entire economy13 (horizontal axis) against 
changes in nominal effective exchange rates 
(vertical axis) over the period 2001-2006. In 
order to better reflect the impact of the nominal 
appreciation on the domestic economy, NEER 
changes have been weighted by Member States' 
export-to-GDP ratio.14 The data presented in 
Graph 20 show no correlation between changes 
in profit margins and the adjusted NEER 
measure. This result suggests that the 
                                                     
12  As those factors are largely independent of the euro 
appreciation, they are not analysed here. For an analysis 
of the determinants of the euro-area export performance, 
see Quarterly Report on the Euro Area No 1/2005. 
13  i.e. including the exporting and the non-exporting sectors. 
14  The reasoning for this adjustment is that in a more open 
economy the share of companies that is exposed to the 
currency fluctuation is larger and so is the share of 
affected profit. 
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appreciation of the euro has not had a significant 
effect on changes in the profit margins.  
Graph 20: Change in profit margins(1) and in nominal 
effective exchange rates adjusted for country 
openness(2) (2001-2006)  
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(1) Profit margins are measured by the inverted real unit labour 
costs for the entire economy.  
(2) NEER changes adjusted by the export-to-GDP ratio (average 
over 2001-2006).  
Source: Commission services 
2.4. Conclusion 
The euro's appreciation since 2001 has had 
positive implications for euro-area prices and 
purchasing power but has also weighed on 
exporters' performance.   
Regarding the former effect, the analysis shows 
that a change in the euro exchange rate has a 
large and rapid impact on euro-area import prices 
but that the knock-on effect to producer and 
consumer prices is slower and more muted. 
Exchange rate pass-through varies across 
products (due to differing product characteristics 
and industry-specific market structures), regions 
and time (due to the general economic condition 
and environment). In addition, it may be affected 
by whether market participants believe a shock to 
be permanent or temporary. Overall, 
econometric work suggests that the appreciation 
of the euro since 2001 should bring gains in 
household purchasing power of about 5% in the 
long run. 
As to its impact on trade, that analysis shows that 
fluctuations in the real exchange rate feed 
through into the export performance relatively 
rapidly but with a relatively modest effect: a 1% 
appreciation of the real exchange rate reduces the 
level of extra-area exports by 0.25% after two 
years. Between 2001 and 2006, exchange rate 
developments reduced annual growth in extra-
area exports by 0.6 percentage points. This is not 
negligible but should be put in perspective. In the 
same period, buoyant world trade boosted euro-
area export growth by about 6% annually. 
Furthermore, the real appreciation since 2001 
follows a period of even greater depreciation in 
the second half of the 1990s, when exchange rate 
developments boosted extra-area exports by 
about 0.5 percentage points annually.  
The appreciation since 2001 also seems to have 
had only a modest effect on exporters' 
profitability. In recent years, there has been 
considerable heterogeneity in export 
performance at the Member States' level. This 
heterogeneity, however, primarily reflects 
differences in national price and non-price 
competitiveness developments rather than a euro 
effect. Due to differences in the geographical 
composition of extra-area trade, some Member 
States have been more exposed than others to 
the euro appreciation. However, differences in 
exposure have played only a modest role in 
explaining differences in export growth. 
Finally, the euro appreciation has also, to some 
extent, fostered extra-area imports primarily 
because it has stimulated domestic demand by 
raising purchasing power, and also because it has 
encouraged import substitution, though 
econometric analysis suggests that the latter 
effect is small.  
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3.  Spillovers revisited: fiscal policy and 
inflation in the euro area 
Safeguarding price stability in the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) requires an appropriate 
fiscal policy stance at national level. The very 
architecture of the EMU rests on this crucial 
understanding of the interactions between fiscal 
and monetary policy-making. To the extent that 
national fiscal policies have a sufficiently strong 
effect on domestic demand and in turn on area-
wide price developments they may also affect the 
rest of the single currency area. It is therefore 
important to understand the channels through 
which fiscal policy can impact on inflation and, 
in particular, how strong these channels are in 
practice. 
There is a broad strand in the empirical literature 
that suggests that, in contrast to the ‘Ricardian’ 
paradigm, whereby fiscal policy should not affect 
aggregate demand, fiscal shocks do have an 
impact on activity and in turn on inflation.15 
Moreover, as regards the specific setup of the 
EMU, there is also a general theoretical 
consensus that fiscal and monetary policy 
interactions may give rise to policy conflicts in 
the short term, as the area-wide inflation rate is 
determined together with the aggregate of 
national output levels.16 What is less clear is the 
actual strength of the impact of fiscal policy on 
inflation. The available evidence is still mixed, 
especially as regards the spillovers to other 
Member States in a monetary union. 
Channels through which fiscal policy can 
impact upon inflation 
In an economy characterised by nominal 
rigidities and liquidity-constrained consumers, 
different types of fiscal policy measures produce 
different types of effects on prices in terms of 
both timing and size.  Under normal 
circumstances, an increase in government 
expenditure, for instance, including the 
                                                     
15  For a brief list of the literature, see Woodford, M. (2001) 
'Fiscal Requirements for Price Stability', Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 669-728. 
16  See, for instance, Dixit, A. and L. Lambertini (2001) 
'Monetary-fiscal policy interactions and commitment 
versus discretion in a monetary union', European Economic 
Review No. 45, pp. 977-997. 
government wage bill, or the reduction of net 
income taxes, leads first to an excess of aggregate 
demand over output. The impact on prices sets 
in gradually as the economy adjusts to higher 
demand. In stylised fashion, such an adjustment 
involves an expansion of employment, which 
creates pressure on wages and in turn on prices. 
Prices continue to rise until demand is back in 
line with the level of potential output. At the end 
of the adjustment process, the general price level 
will be higher. The size of the short-run effect on 
output and inflation (and at times also the sign) 
depends on a number of factors. 
(i) The degree of openness of an economy: Part of a fiscal 
expansion leaks through imports, where the size 
of the leakage increases with the import content 
of domestic demand. 
(ii) The type of fiscal policy measure: An increase in 
government consumption is generally expected 
to have a stronger impact on demand than tax 
cuts of the same size, because tax cuts work via 
disposable income of households, part of which 
is generally saved. 
(iii) The planning horizon of economic agents: If 
economic agents are forward-looking, they will 
assess the sustainability of a fiscal expansion. 
Where the fiscal expansion is deemed to be 
unsustainable, future tax increases will be 
anticipated and hence expenditure plans adjusted 
accordingly; i.e. government consumption will 
crowd out private spending.  
 (iv) The share of liquidity-constrained consumers: If a 
large share of consumers cannot borrow against 
future income, for instance because of 
imperfections in the capital markets, the short-
term impact of a fiscal expansion (contraction) 
on output and inflation can be stronger than in 
an economy in which consumers have 'free' 
access to capital markets. 
(v) The monetary policy regime: Expansionary fiscal 
policy can be countered by the tightening of 
monetary policy. The degree of tightening will 
depend on the objectives of the monetary 
authority. A central bank that focuses exclusively 
on a specific inflation target will step in more 
strongly than a central bank that also performs 
interest rate smoothing (i.e. that tries not to 
impose strong and sudden changes in the interest 
rate on the economy).  
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Box 4: Simulating effects of fiscal policy on inflation – Evidence from the literature 
 
In the literature, two different approaches are used to simulate the effects of fiscal policy and inflation: Structural 
Vector Autoregression Models (SVARs) and structural macro-econometric models. The main difference between the 
two is that SVARs are largely data-driven: they do not impose strong a priori restrictions upon relationships between 
the macroeconomic variables included in the model. In practice, evidence from SVAR models is limited and does 
not support clear-cut conclusions. Conversely, macro-econometric models have been widely used to assess the 
impact of fiscal shocks on inflation. The results of macro-econometric models reported in the table below can be 
summarised as follows: 
- An increase in government spending by 1% of GDP leads to an increase in consumer prices of less than 1% 
compared to the baseline while, in the case of increases in indirect taxes, the price effect is more significant (1-1.5%). 
- The impact on inflation of fiscal policy shocks tends to increase in the first two years after the shock, and then to 
stabilise afterwards. 
 
Impact of fiscal shocks on countries' own consumer price indices 
Evidence from alternative macro-models (% change compared with baseline) 
Country Model Shock 
  Government purchases 
(1% of GDP increase) 
Indirect taxes 
(1% of GDP increase) 
  Year t Year t+1 Year t Year t+1 
Belgium National Bank of Belgium 0.10 0.29 1.6 1.99 
Belgium QUEST-II (EC) 0.10  1.66  
France Interlink (OECD) 0.20  1.40  
France QUEST-II (EC) 0.14  1.50  
Germany Bundesbank 0.04 0.17 1.17 1.2 
Germany Interlink (OECD) 0.20  1.30  
Germany NiGEM (NIESR) * 0.02 0.31   
Germany Marmotte (CEPII) * 0.71 0.69   
Germany Multimod-III (IMF) * 0.68 0.78   
Germany QUEST-II (EC) 0.12  1.49  
Italy Banca d’ Italia 0.06 0.33 0.79 1.39 
Italy Interlink (OECD) 0.20  0.80  
Italy QUEST-II (EC) 0.12  1.38  
Portugal Banco de Portugal 0.07 0.18 1.10 1.59 
Spain Banco de Espana 0.20 0.62 1.05 1.46 
Spain QUEST-II (EC) 0.08  1.44  
Euro area Area Wide Model (ECB) 0.16 0.56 0.85 1.17 
Euro area Interlink (OECD) 0.20  1.20  
Source: Henry et al. (2004), except for * whose source is Gros and Hobza (2001). 
 
Existing work aimed at assessing the impact of national fiscal policy measures on the rest of the euro area, i.e. the 
magnitude of inflation spillovers, is relatively scarce. Among the few exceptions are Gros and Hobza (2001) and in’t 
Veld (2004). The few available studies point to a positive but small spillover, where an increase in government 
purchases in Germany of 1% of GDP leads in the first year to higher consumer prices in other euro-area countries, 
ranging from a 0.5% to 0.2%.  
References: 
Gros, D. and A. Hobza (2001) ‘Fiscal policy spillovers in the euro area. Where are they?’ CEPS Working Document No. 176. 
Henry, J., P. Hernandez de Cos and S. Momigliano (2004), 'The short-term impact of government budgets on prices. Evidence 
from macroeconometric models', ECB Working Paper Series No. 396, forthcoming in Journal of Policy Modeling. 
In’t Veld. J. (2004) The Spillover Effects of German Budgetary Consolidations within EMU: Simulations with the QUEST 
Model, mimeo European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. 
 
Direct effects of fiscal policy on inflation via 
taxes 
A number of fiscal policy measures on the 
revenue side of the budget may have a direct 
effect on prices. The clearest case is a change in 
indirect taxes. An increase in indirect taxation is 
generally expected to lead to a more or less 
immediate increase in HICP inflation where the 
size of the impact depends on how much firms 
are able to pass on to consumers. The pass-
through tends to be high (low) if demand is 
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rather inelastic (elastic). The direct impact is 
likely to be followed by an offsetting effect via 
aggregate demand as higher taxes reduce real 
disposable income.  
A less immediate impact on prices can be 
expected from increases in direct taxation (i.e. 
corporate and personal income tax) because taxes 
are not part of the HICP basket. Higher 
corporate income tax is likely to be passed on 
gradually to consumer prices whereas higher 
income tax may actually have a dampening effect 
on prices as it primarily compresses consumption 
and aggregate demand. 
Effects of national fiscal policy in the EMU  
The combination of a common monetary policy 
and national fiscal policies in the EMU 
introduces an additional dimension to the link 
between fiscal policies and inflation. If a member 
of the single currency area pushes its output 
above potential by means of an expansionary 
fiscal policy and if the ensuing increase in the 
price level has a measurable effect on the rate of 
inflation of the currency area as a whole, the 
monetary authority may tighten its policy stance 
in a bid to bring overall inflation back to its 
target. By doing so, it will not only affect output 
in the country that runs an expansionary fiscal 
policy; the aggregate level of economic activity of 
other countries will be affected as well.  
The size of such spillovers crucially depends on 
the size and the trade exposure of the country 
running expansionary fiscal policy. The spillover 
effect mostly plays through the trade channel. Since 
part of the output and price effect of 
expansionary fiscal policy will leak through 
imports, a higher size and higher degree of 
openness of the economy will produce a larger 
positive spillover onto trade partners and dilute 
the output and inflation effect across or outside 
the currency area.  
In EMU, the trade channel interacts with two 
additional channels which operate in opposite 
directions: the real interest rate channel and the 
competitiveness channel.  
(i) The interest rate channel: Higher inflation coupled 
with a common area-wide nominal interest rate 
reduces the real cost of capital and hence 
promotes investment and consumption of 
durables. This tends to amplify the demand 
effects of the fiscal expansion both domestically 
and in other Member States. 
(ii) The competitiveness channel. The initial effect of 
the fiscal expansion on domestic activity is 
progressively eroded as higher domestic inflation 
affects the competitiveness of the country, 
hampering its export performance. 
A detailed analysis of how adjustment has been 
proceeding in the euro area was presented in 
European Commission (2006).17 One of the main 
conclusions was that, in the EMU, the real 
interest rate channel together with nominal or 
real rigidities in the economy can give rise to a 
longer and possibly deeper impact of shocks on 
output and inflation as compared to a situation 
with decentralised monetary policy. During such 
a protracted adjustment, large current account 
imbalances may build up. There is also a larger 
risk of running pro-cyclical fiscal policy in 
economic good times as both potential output 
and structural tax revenues may be 
overestimated.18 If the corresponding windfalls 
are spent, fiscal policy will be too expansionary 
and limit the room for manoeuvre during 
subsequent downturns. 
Fiscal policy and inflation in the EMU: 
empirical evidence 
Model simulations are an established way of 
gauging the macroeconomic effects of economic 
policy measures. The results presented in the 
following paragraphs are based on a two-country 
version of the macro-econometric model of the 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs of the European Commission (QUEST-
III), a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE) model, estimated for the euro area. The 
model exhibits a number of price and wage 
                                                     
17  European Commission (2006) 'The EU Economy 2006 
Review', European Economy No. 6, Brussels. 
18  Potential output is, loosely speaking, estimated as a sort 
of moving average of actual and projected GDP. 
Consequently, protracted adjustment processes will affect 
the assessment of potential output and with it the 
estimated level of sustainable government revenues and 
expenditure. 
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rigidities and assumes that a fraction of private 
households are liquidity-constrained, i.e. they 
cannot borrow against their future income. These 
features generate positive effects of fiscal policy 
on output and consumption (see Box 4 for a 
review of the estimated effects of fiscal policy on 
inflation found in the empirical literature).19 
The purpose of the simulation is to provide an 
account of the impact of fiscal policy both on the 
inflation rate of the country implementing fiscal 
policy measures and on the inflation rate of the 
rest of the euro area.   
Two different types of fiscal policy measures are 
simulated: an increase in government purchases 
and in value added taxes. As regards government 
purchases, the focus is on temporary changes.20 
As regards increases in value added taxes, 
alternative reactions of monetary policy are 
explored. The simulations are performed with 
respect to the 2007 baseline scenario.  
In a bid to capture the country dimension in 
terms of both size and degree of openness, 
simulations are performed for different 
economies: Germany, Spain, Ireland and the 
Netherlands. Germany is a large and open 
economy; Spain is a medium-sized country with 
relatively little openness; Ireland is small and 
open; while the Netherlands is a medium-sized 
and open economy. 
When interpreting the results of the simulations, 
two caveats should be born in mind. First, fiscal 
policy may affect inflation through a number of 
additional channels not captured by the model, 
including possible contagion effects from public-
sector wages to private-sector wages, changes in 
administrated prices or in the efficiency of public 
procurement. Second, the simulated fiscal shocks 
are expansionary but the model is symmetric and 
                                                     
19  For a detailed description of the model, see Langedijk, S. 
and W. Roeger (2007), 'Adjustment in EMU: A model-
based analysis of country experiences', European 
Economy, Economic Paper No. 274. 
20  The dynamic nature of the model imposes intertemporal 
budget constraint in the long term. Any expenditure 
increase or tax reduction must be reversed at some point. 
As a result, the effect of fiscal policy on output and 
inflation is smaller for a longer-lasting increase in 
government expenditure, as the forward-looking share of 
consumers anticipates future tax increases and adjusts 
consumption accordingly. 
contractionary shocks would have opposite 
effects of similar order of magnitudes on 
inflation.  
Expenditure shocks. The simulations show that 
in the first two years, inflation (as measured by 
the consumer price deflator) always rises in the 
country where government expenditures are 
increased by 1% of GDP for one year. The 
impact tends to taper off gradually after two 
years. The magnitude of the impact of 
expenditure shocks on inflation is highly country-
specific, being at its largest in a large open 
economy like Germany (more than 0.5%) and 
smallest in a small open economy like Ireland 
(about 0.02 %) (differences are mostly explained 
by the different degree of openness. 
Graph 21: Impact on domestic prices of a temporary 
increase in government purchases of 1% of GDP (1) 
(% change from baseline level of consumer price deflator) 
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(1) Government expenditures are increased for one year. 
Source: Commission services. 
Spillover effects on inflation in the rest of the 
euro area appear to be on average positive but 
only in a few cases of sizeable magnitude. In line 
with expectations, the size of spillovers appears 
to increase with the size of the economy engaging 
in the fiscal expansion. The largest spillover was 
in the case of a temporary expenditure shock of 
1% of GDP in Germany, which led to an 
increase in inflation in the rest of the euro area of 
about 0.4%. The explanation is that fiscal shocks 
in bigger countries trigger trade effects of a bigger 
magnitude. It also appears that spillover effects 
tend to grow over time and stabilise, which is 
mainly related to the impact of imported 
inflation: higher import prices feed into wages 
and then domestic prices. 
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Graph 22: Impact on the rest of the euro-area prices of a 
temporary increase in government purchases of 1% of 
GDP in a given country (1) 
(% change from baseline level of consumer price deflator)  
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(1) Government expenditures are increased for one year. 
Source: Commission services. 
Increase in value added taxes (VAT). An 
increase in value added taxes impacts on the 
national consumer price index. However, due to 
an imperfect pass-through onto consumer prices 
and to lower aggregate demand, consumer prices 
net of VAT fall. The impact is fairly constant 
over time where the monetary authority fails to 
react to higher inflation, ranging from 0.7% to 
0.9% of the consumer price deflator (Graph 23).  
Graph 23: Impact on domestic prices of an increase in 
value added taxes of 1% of GDP (1) 
(% change from baseline level of consumer price deflator)  
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(1) Monetary authority does not react to inflation effect. 
Source: Commission services. 
Unsurprisingly, the impact on inflation declines 
and fades over time if the monetary authority 
steps in (Graph 24). The degree of monetary 
tightening and its impact on domestic inflation 
clearly reflects the relative weight of the country 
implementing the VAT increase.   
Graph 24: Impact on domestic prices of an increase in 
value added taxes of 1% of GDP (1) 
(% change from baseline level of consumer price deflator)  
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(1) Monetary authority reacts to inflation effect. 
Source: Commission services. 
The spillover effects from a VAT increase to the 
rest of the currency area appear to be negative: 
inflation in the rest of the euro area tends to fall 
(Graph 25), more so if the monetary authority 
reacts (Graph 26). However, the spillover effect 
appears to be smaller than with an expenditure 
shock, mainly due to the muted impact on 
aggregate demand. 
Graph 25: Impact on prices in the rest of the euro area 
of a rise in value added taxes of 1% of GDP in a given 
country (1)  
(% change from baseline level of consumer price deflator) 
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(1) Monetary authority does not react to inflation effect. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Graph 26: Impact on prices in the rest of the euro area 
of an increase in value added taxes of 1% of GDP in a 
given country (1) 
(% change from baseline level of consumer price deflator) 
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(1) Monetary authority reacts to inflation effect. 
Source: Commission services. 
This simulation exercise helps to draw a number 
of conclusions. Inflation effects from fiscal 
policy on the domestic economy can be quite 
sizeable. Whether an expansionary fiscal policy 
operates via an increase in expenditures or tax 
cuts may, in the short run, have opposite results 
on inflation in the domestic economy.  
Inflation spillovers to the rest of the area tend to 
go in the direction taken by the stance of fiscal 
policy. The magnitude of the spillovers depends 
on both the size and the trade openness of the 
country considered and can be sizeable when the 
fiscal impulse comes from a large open economy.  
The effects of the simulations need to be 
considered in a situation where fiscal policy often 
involves a combination of measures with 
possibly opposed effects. Hence the overall 
effects on the country, as well on the spillovers, 
may be significantly more complex than 
presented here. The evidence of the inflationary 
impact of the recent VAT increase in Germany, 
much smaller than originally expected, is 
indicative. 
Nevertheless, the evidence of this exercise 
suggests that spillovers across countries could be 
relevant and potentially entail policy reactions by 
other actors, which could be usefully internalised 
by national policy makers in their decision 
process.  
4. A Mid-Term Review of Budgetary 
policy in the euro area 
Tax revenues explain better-than-expected 
budgetary outturn in 2006 
The budgetary situation continued to improve in 
the euro area in 2006. The general government 
deficit was reduced for the third consecutive 
year, to 1.6% of GDP (see Graph 27). This is a 
markedly better outturn than the deficit of 2.3% 
of GDP projected for 2006 in the end-2005 
Stability Programmes (SPs) and than the 
estimated outcome of 2.1% in the end-2006 
SPs.21 Owing also to stronger GDP growth, the 
euro-area debt ratio recorded its first decline in 
2006 since 2002. According to Commission 
calculations, in 2006 the improvement in the 
budgetary situation was marked by a large 
reduction in the deficit adjusted for cyclical 
effects and one-off measures – almost 1 
percentage point of GDP, following ¾ of a 
percentage point of GDP in 2005. The 
improvement in the structural balance in 2006 
was significantly larger than envisaged in the end-
2006 SPs (½ of a percentage point). 
Graph 27: Budgetary developments and prospects in 
the euro area according to the Commission spring 2007 
forecast (% of GDP) 
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Note: Projections for 2008 are based on a no policy change 
assumption.  
Source: Commission services. 
                                                     
21 Budgetary developments were significantly better than 
expected by most euro-area Member States (Germany, 
Spain, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Finland) in their end-2006 SPs. 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 29 -  
The composition of the fiscal adjustment raises 
doubts, however, on the permanent nature of 
ongoing fiscal consolidation. Contrary to plans, 
the reduction in the government deficit was 
primarily driven by large positive surprises in tax 
revenues – well beyond what could have been 
expected on the basis of the stronger-than-
expected increase in real GDP. Given that part 
of the tax windfalls may be of a temporary 
nature,22 the structural balance estimates may to 
some extent overestimate the underlying 
improvement in the situation of government 
finances. Moreover, as in 2005, some Member 
States used part of the tax windfalls in 2006 to 
finance additional government expenditure (see 
Box 5). In the last two years, the size of the 
expenditure overruns compared to the budget 
plans has not been negligible: the cumulated 
improvement in the structural balance over the 
period 2005-2006 could have been about ¾ of a 
percentage point of GDP larger if government 
expenditure targets in the 2005 and 2006 budgets 
had been met.  
 
Table 5: Recent and projected budgetary 
developments in the euro area 
 COM spring 2007 forecast 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Real GDP growth 1.4 2.7 2.6 2.5 
Government balance -2.5 -1.6 -1.0 -0.8 
Structural balance -2.0 -1.1 -0.8 -0.7 
     Annual change  0.8 0.9 0.3 0.1 
Government debt  70.5 69.0 66.9 65.0 
 2006 updates of the SCP 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Real GDP growth 1.4 2.6 2.2 2.2  
Government balance -2.4 -2.1 -1.4 -1.1 
Structural balance -2.0 -1.6 -1.2 -1.0 
     Annual change  0.8 0.4 0.4 0.2 
Government debt  70.6 69.4 67.8 66.4 
Note: Commission services' projections for 2008 are based on a 
no policy change assumption. 
Source: End-2006 Stability Programmes and Commission spring 
2007 forecast. 
 
 
                                                     
22  A significant part of the tax windfalls stems from the 
dynamism of corporate income tax, which was notably 
driven by a sizeable and largely unexplained increase in 
the effective average tax rate. Experience has shown that 
fluctuations in the effective corporate tax rate can be large 
and act in both directions.  
Limited fiscal consolidation efforts expected 
in 2007 and 2008 
The end-2006 updates of the Stability 
Programmes, which were submitted before the 
better-than-expected 2006 outturns were known, 
projected a reduction in the government deficit 
to 1.4% of GDP in 2007 and 1.1% of GDP in 
2008 (see Table 5). Projections were based on the 
assumption of real GDP growing at a close-to-
potential rate over the period 2007-2008. The 
structural balance was planned to improve by ½ 
of a percentage point of GDP in 2007 and by ¼ 
of a percentage point in 2008. When assessing 
these programmes, the Council recommended 
that some Member States not yet at their 
medium-term budgetary objective should take 
advantage of the good economic conditions to 
strengthen the structural adjustments compared 
to plans.  
Graph 28: Real GDP growth in the euro area in 2007 
and 2008 – a comparison with projections of the end-
2006 Stability Programmes (y-o-y real GDP growth) 
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Source: Commission services. 
According to the Commission spring 2007 
forecast, real GDP growth would be more 
dynamic than expected in the end-2006 SPs and 
the output gap of the euro area would be almost 
closed in 2008 (see Graph 28). The Commission 
projects an improvement in the structural 
balance in 2007 of only ¼ of a percentage point 
of GDP, as opposed to ½ of a percentage point 
in the SPs, and, under the assumption of no 
policy change, a neutral fiscal stance in 2008. 
Moreover, on the basis of the experience at the 
turn of the decade, when several Member States 
benefited from favourable cyclical conditions  
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Box 5: Revenues explain better-than-expected deficit outturn in 2005 and 2006 
 
The table below provides, for 2005 and 2006, detailed information on the reasons for the discrepancy between the 
government balance planned for year t in the Stability Programmes submitted in December t-1 and the observed 
government balance. The table shows that, cumulated over the two years, real GDP growth was in line with plans. 
The most relevant message concerns how the composition of fiscal consolidation differed from plans. In both years, 
the planned fiscal consolidation was based on expenditure restraint. Nominal government expenditure was planned 
to increase by 2.3% in 2005 and 3.1% in 2006. Government revenue was planned to increase by 3.4% in 2005 and 
3.6% in 2006. Outcomes turned out to be significantly different.  
Government revenue increased much faster than planned in both years, by about 4% in 2005 and 6% in 2006. 
Cumulated over the two years, the larger-than-planned increase in government revenue contributed to an 
improvement in the government balance compared to plans of about 1½ percentage points of GDP. The larger-
than-planned increase in government revenue in these years mainly reflected favourable tax yields (cumulated GDP 
growth was roughly in line with plans). Government expenditure also increased significantly faster than planned, by 
3.4% in 2005 and 4.0% in 2006. The cumulated expenditure overruns represent about 1.0 percentage point of GDP. 
The one-off increase in expenditure in Italy in 2006 accounts for ¼ of a percentage point of GDP. 
 
Budgetary plans and outcomes in 2005 and 2006 in the euro area 
 2005 2006 
 Plans for year t in Dec (t-1)  SP Outcome for year t 
Plans for year t in Dec 
(t-1)  SP Outcome for year t
 Real GDP growth in year t 2.3 1.5 2.0 2.7 
 Budget balance in year t-1 (2004 / 2005) -2.8 (a) -2.8 (f) -2.6 (a) -2.5 (f) 
 Budget balance in year t (2005 / 2006) -2.3 (b) -2.5 (g) -2.4 (b) -1.6 (g) 
 Change in the budget balance in year t 0.5 (c) 0.3 (h) 0.2 (c) 0.9 (h) 
 Change in the expenditure ratio in year t -0.9 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 
 Change in the revenue ratio in year t -0.4 0.3 -0.1 0.7 
 Increase in nominal expenditure in year t 2.3 (d) 3.4 (i) 3.1 (d) 4.1 (i) 
 Increase in nominal revenue in year t 3.4 (e) 4.0 (j) 3.6 (e) 6.1 (j) 
 Budget balance surprise compared to target 
(g)-(b) 
-0.2 0.7 
  Of which: base effect (f)-(a) 0.0 0.0 
  Of which: variation effect (h)-(c) -0.2 0.6 
    Of which: expenditure overruns (-) (1) -0.5 -0.5 
    Of which: revenue windfalls (+) (2) 0.3 1.1 
Notes: (1) and (2) are calculated as (-(i)-(d))*(Exp/GDPt-1) and ((j)-(e))*(Rev/GDPt-1). 
Source: 2004 and 2005 SPs and Commission spring 2007 forecast. 
 
and better-than-expected budgetary outcomes 
loosened fiscal policy relative to plans, there is a 
risk that the better-than-expected budgetary 
outturns in 2006 will lead to less ambitious or 
less durable consolidation efforts in 2007 and 
2008 than currently expected.  
Good times for fiscal consolidation 
The prospects for continued economic growth 
are better than they have been for many years. 
This favourable outlook provides Member States 
with an opportunity to consolidate government 
finances and to progress towards sustainable 
budgetary positions. This would be in line with 
the principles agreed in the context of the 2005 
reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), 
which specify that structural efforts towards the 
medium-term budgetary objectives (MTOs) 
should be higher than the benchmark adjustment 
of 0.5% of GDP in good times. The revised Code 
of Conduct on the application of the SGP 
defines good times as "periods where output 
exceeds its potential level, taking into account tax 
elasticities".23 It specifies that "given the 
uncertainty surrounding output gap levels’ 
estimates, the change in the output gap could 
                                                     
23  See document "Specifications on the implementation of the 
Stability and Growth Pact and Guidelines on the format and 
content of Stability and Convergence Programmes", endorsed by 
the Ecofin Council in September 2005. 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 31 -  
also be considered, especially when the output 
gap is estimated to be close to zero" and that the 
identification of periods of good times should be 
made "after an overall economic assessment".  
The ex-ante identification of good times is a difficult 
exercise, not only because of the usual 
uncertainties associated with economic 
forecasting but also because different economic 
indicators may point in different directions. 
Moreover, standard tools – for instance, to 
calculate output gaps – may partly fail to capture 
the complexity of economic developments. 
These uncertainties imply that a prudent stance 
should be taken in the identification of good 
times. This is essential if mistakes of the past are 
not to be repeated, when policy-makers realised 
only after the boom period that they had 
witnessed economic good times and therefore 
missed the opportunity to progress with 
consolidation. In line with the Code of Conduct, 
the identification of good times should be based 
on the examination of overall economic 
conditions. Converging factors suggest that the 
current period is a good time for fiscal 
consolidation:  
(i) The output gap is slightly negative and 
moving towards positive territory. Real 
GDP growth reached 2.7% in 2006 and is 
projected to remain above potential in 2007 
and 2008. According to the spring 2007 
forecast of the Commission, the output gap 
of the euro area, which is currently slightly 
negative, will become positive in the course of 
2008.  
(ii) The labour market situation is improving 
rapidly. Two million new jobs were created 
in the euro area in 2006 and the euro-area 
unemployment rate reached its lowest level in 
more than a decade. The fall in the 
unemployment rate is largely attributable to 
the cyclical upswing - according to 
Commission calculations, the unemployment 
gap (i.e. the difference between structural 
unemployment and actual unemployment) is 
set to close in the course of 2007 - although 
available estimates also point to a fall in the 
structural rate of unemployment. The 
Commission expects the situation on the 
labour market to continue to improve in 2007 
and 2008. 
(iii) Favourable tax elasticities. Government 
revenues have increased much faster than 
nominal GDP in the last two years. 
According to the latest information, in the last 
two years, the ratio of government revenue to 
GDP has increased by about one percentage 
point of GDP (0.6 percentage points in 2006 
alone). This reflects the effect of favourable 
growth composition, as GDP has been 
supported by the dynamism of tax-rich 
components (domestic demand), positive 
labour market developments, and a number 
of other positive developments (e.g. 
developments in asset prices, dynamism of 
profits and corporate tax revenues, etc.).  
Table 6: Recent and projected budgetary 
developments in the euro area (in%) 
 
 Real GDP  Growth (1)  
Government 
balance (1) 
Structural 
balance (1) 
 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
BE 3.1 2.3 2.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 0.1
DE 2.7 2.5 2.4 -1.7 -0.6 -0.3 -1.5 -0.8 -0.7
EL 4.3 3.7 3.7 -2.6 -2.4 -2.7 -3.9 -3.6 -3.4
ES 3.9 3.7 3.4 1.8 1.4 1.2 2.3 1.8 1.7
FR 2.0 2.4 2.3 -2.5 -2.4 -1.9 -2.3 -2.1 -1.5
IE 6.0 5.0 4.0 2.9 1.5 1.0 3.0 1.8 1.6
IT 1.9 1.9 1.7 -4.4 -2.1 -2.2 -2.6 -1.6 -1.8
LU 6.2 5.0 4.7 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.8
NL 2.9 2.8 2.6 0.6 -0.7 0.0 1.1 -0.4 0.1
AT 3.1 2.9 2.5 -1.1 -0.9 -0.8 -1.0 -1.1 -1.2
PT 1.3 1.8 2.0 -3.9 -3.5 -3.2 -2.9 -2.7 -2.6
SI 5.2 4.3 4.0 -1.4 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.7 -1.7
FI  5.5 3.1 2.7 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.6
EA 2.7 2.6 2.5 -1.6 -1.0 -0.8 -1.1 -0.8 -0.7
Note: Projections for 2008 are based on a no policy change 
assumption. 
Source: Commission spring 2007 forecast. 
 
Stronger efforts expected in some euro-area 
Member States 
Overall, the current economic and budgetary 
developments clearly point to a situation of 
"good times" in the euro area and most of its 
Member States. This was explicitly recognised by 
the Eurogroup in the context of the annual Mid-
Term Review of budgetary developments (see 
Box 6). An examination of budgetary plans 
suggests however that, only two years after the 
reform of the SGP, several Member States are 
not pursuing the sound fiscal policy principles 
laid down in the revised SGP for such periods. In 
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particular, some Member States which have 
achieved their MTO seem to be pursuing pro-
cyclical fiscal policies while others not yet at their 
MTO are not pursuing an annual structural 
adjustment of at least ½% of GDP. This runs 
counter to the spirit and the letter of the 
preventive part of the Pact.  
Table 6 summarises the main results of the 
Commission spring 2007 forecast. The following 
messages emerge from the table:  
(i) Several Member States currently at their 
MTO are expected to loosen their fiscal 
stance in 2007. According to the Commission 
spring 2007 forecast, fiscal loosening under 
current policies would exceed one percentage 
point of GDP in Ireland and the Netherlands. 
The fiscal stance in Spain would be mildly 
expansionary with the structural balance 
worsening by ½ of a percentage point. Such 
pro-cyclical policies are not optimal from a 
domestic point of view, nor from the 
perspective of the overall euro-area policy 
mix, as some of these countries can be 
considered to benefit from good economic 
times in 2007. In 2008, only the Netherlands 
would achieve a marked improvement in the 
structural balance, which would not, however, 
offset the large deterioration in 2007.24  
(ii) A number of countries adjusting towards 
their MTO do not plan sufficient fiscal 
efforts in 2007 and 2008. According to the 
Commission spring 2007 forecast, Germany 
will be the only country to achieve an 
improvement in structural balance of more 
than ½ of a percentage point of GDP in 
2007. The fiscal effort would fall short of the 
0.5% benchmark in France and Greece, and 
also in Slovenia and Austria, where a slight 
deterioration of the structural balance is 
projected. None of the countries in this group 
can be considered to suffer from economic 
bad times and should therefore, according to 
the SGP principles, at least achieve the 
                                                     
24  In the Netherlands, the budgetary outcome in 2007 is 
likely to turn out significantly worse than anticipated in 
the budget, partly on account of lower gas receipts.. 
Based on current information, the nominal balance in 
2008 would improve reflecting notably tax elasticities 
returning to their long term average and a recovery of gas 
revenues. 
benchmark fiscal effort of ½ of a percentage 
point of GDP. In 2008, France and Greece 
envisage in their end-2006 SPs a structural 
improvement in line with the ½ of a 
percentage point of GDP benchmark. Fiscal 
plans in the other countries deviate from the 
SGP principles. In spite of good times, 
Germany plans no more than a stabilisation 
of its structural balance in 2008. In France, in 
the absence of offsetting measures, the 
announced tax-reduction measures not 
contemplated in the 2007 Budget would entail 
a smaller structural improvement than 
projected in the Commission's spring forecast 
for 2007 and, specially, 2008. 
(iii) Finally, the two countries currently subject 
to an excessive deficit procedure, Portugal 
and Italy, are expected to make progress 
towards the correction of the excessive deficit 
position. Italy plans to achieve the required 
improvement of its structural balance in 2007, 
although a less favourable picture for the 
developments of public finances has emerged 
in the context of the new medium-term 
financial planning document of the 
government. For Portugal, the forecast points 
to a modest improvement in the structural 
balance in 2007. According to the 
Commission spring 2007 forecast, the 
structural balance in 2008 will remain broadly 
unchanged in view of the no policy change 
assumption, which indicates that the measures 
needed to achieve the planned consolidation 
still have to be taken and implemented.  
Conclusions and fiscal policy orientations 
agreed by euro-area Finance Ministers 
In a context where all large euro-area Member 
States have just corrected or are about to correct 
their excessive deficits, the challenge ahead is to 
ensure continuation of consolidation efforts and 
to a move towards the MTOs. This would create 
the necessary scope for the full working of the 
automatic stabilisers in less favourable cyclical 
phases and allow debt levels to be reduced before 
the budgetary effects of the retirement of the 
baby boom generation set in. Moreover, rigorous 
fiscal policies would contribute to keeping 
interest rates low and therefore to the crowding-
in of investment and to lower debt servicing 
costs.  
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On 20 April 2007, during the discussion on the 
Mid-Term Review of Budgetary policies 
(MTBR), euro-area Finance Ministers took these 
factors into account when assessing national 
fiscal policies for 2007 and intentions for 2008. 
Ministers provided clear orientations for the 
conduct of fiscal policies in the Member States 
(see Box 6) in the coming eighteen months. They 
agreed notably that Member states that have not 
yet reached their medium term objective (MTO) 
should make use of the benign economic outlook 
to speed up the pace of deficit and debt 
reduction, and thus to achieve at least the 
benchmark of 0.5% of GDP annual fiscal 
adjustment in structural terms. They also 
committed themselves to implementing their 
2007 budgets as planned, avoiding expenditure 
overruns, and to carefully designing fiscal policy 
plans for 2008 so as to accelerate adjustment 
towards the MTO for Member States which have 
not reached it and, for those which have reached 
it, to avoid feeding macroeconomic imbalances. 
Box 6: The Mid-Term Review of Budgetary developments 
 
In the context of the SGP reform, the Council agreed in 2005 that the Eurogroup should discuss, at least once a year 
before the summer, "a horizontal assessment of national budgetary developments and their implications for the euro area as a whole".  
At its meeting of 24 November 2006, the Eurogroup decided that this Mid-Term Budgetary Review (MTBR) should 
be upgraded to a genuine ex-ante policy debate, to be held just before crucial decisions on the budgetary plans for 
the following year are taken in the Member States.  
The Eurogroup agreed in particular that the purposes of the MTBR are: (i) to ensure proper coordination of national 
fiscal policies in the euro area; and (ii) to provide sufficient peer support for sound fiscal policies at national level. To 
enrich the MTBR discussions, Member States were invited to forward information to their peers on their fiscal policy 
intentions for the year t+1. It was also decided to make a change to the calendar of discussions, to ensure that the 
MTBR discussion takes place, for all Member States, at a time when fiscal policy decisions can still be influenced. 
Finally, Ministers concurred that the Eurogroup would agree on conclusions on horizontal and country-specific 
issues. Following the MTBR discussion of 20 April 2007, the Eurogroup adopted conclusions stating notably that: 
“(…) Eurogroup Ministers reaffirm their adherence to the sound fiscal policy principles of the revised SGP and to national fiscal rules 
(…) and agree that the euro area is experiencing economic good times. In this context, they are committed to make full use of the current 
economic growth and the better than expected tax revenues to pursue sound fiscal policies and to avoid pro-cyclical policies in line with the 
SGP provisions. (…) Member states that have not yet reached their MTO are expected to make use of the benign economic outlook to 
speed up the pace of deficit and debt reduction, in order to achieve at least the benchmark of 0.5 % of GDP annual fiscal adjustment in 
structural terms, and to make use of the benign economic outlook to speed up the pace of deficit and debt reduction. Taking advantage of 
the favourable cyclical conditions, most euro area members would achieve their MTOs in 2008 or 2009 and all of them should aim for 
2010 at the latest."  
Ministers commit: (i) to build on the better-than-expected budgetary outcomes in 2006 to pursue more ambitious budgetary targets than 
those set in the 2006 Stability Programmes; (ii) to implement their 2007 budget as planned, avoiding expenditure overruns, and using 
unexpected extra revenues to reduce government deficit and debt; (iii) to carefully design fiscal policy plans for 2008 so as to accelerate 
adjustment towards the MTO for Member states which have not reached it and for those which have reached it to avoid feeding 
macroeconomic imbalances overall.” 
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Focus 
II. EU financial integration and euro-area adjustment 
The process of EU financial integration is predicated on the link between financial development and improved economic 
performance, and reflects a two-step rationale. Integration of Member State financial sectors is expected to promote financial 
development in the EU as a whole and this, in turn, should lead to a higher potential output in the EU economy. In 
addition, just as the financial integration process has benefited from the elimination of currency risk in the euro area, the 
smooth functioning of the euro-area economy depends on the extent to which the euro is underpinned by an integrated financial 
market. A number of financial market indicators confirm increasing integration in the European Union, with the 
introduction of the euro acting as a further catalyst. As a result, portfolios have been rebalanced to improve risk/reward 
structures reducing home bias and leading to increased risk sharing, especially prevalent for the euro area. An important 
message is that the euro-area Member States have even more to gain from financial integration than EU Member States 
outside the euro area. However, it also has potentially unfavourable implications for the euro area essentially due to the fact 
that the process of financial integration has itself constituted an asymmetric shock which has proved to be difficult to cope with. 
1. Introduction 
The financial sector plays a crucial role in a 
modern economy. First, it provides the necessary 
infrastructure to facilitate financial transactions. 
Second, it channels financial resources from 
those in surplus to those in deficit, ensuring an 
efficient allocation of resources, capital 
formation and growth. Third, it facilitates risk 
management by pooling, diversifying and 
reallocating risks among economic agents with 
different risk-taking characteristics and 
possibilities. Within the EU, cross-border 
integration is seen as a means to promote the 
efficiency of the financial sector in performing 
these functions. Cross-border integration has 
additional relevance in the euro area, where the 
financial sector also functions as a mechanism 
for economic adjustment among the participating 
Member States.  
This focus section analyses EU financial 
integration and its role for euro-area adjustment 
from four angles: first, it looks at the respective 
EU policies and their economic rationale; 
second, it reviews the state of play of EU 
financial integration by looking at the actual 
degree of integration achieved to date; third, it 
discusses the benefits and risks of financial 
integration for economic adjustment in the euro 
area; and fourth, it lays out the policies needed to 
optimise the role of financial integration in euro-
area economic adjustment.    
2. EU policies and the rationale for 
financial integration 
The blueprint for an integrated EU financial 
sector is the Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP) proposed in the late 1990s and currently 
in the process of national implementation. The 
FSAP comprises 42 separate measures targeted at 
a wide range of financial activities. These 
measures relate to both the wholesale and retail 
sectors and to the three financial-sector functions 
described above. They establish common rules 
for integrated securities and derivatives markets 
(the Market in Financial Instruments Directive), 
facilitate the raising of capital on an EU-wide 
basis (the Directive on Prospectuses), ensure 
legal certainty in the cross-border use of 
collateral (the Directives on Settlement Finality 
and Financial Collateral Arrangements), set 
common standards for financial reporting (the 
Regulation on International Accounting 
Standards), promote investor confidence and 
market integrity (Directive on Market 
Manipulation) and facilitate cross-border retail 
payments. The implementation of those 
measures within Member States will be aided by 
the four-level ‘Lamfalussy framework’25 which is 
                                                     
25  Following a suggestion by a committee of ‘wise men’ 
headed by Alexandre Lamfalussy, a four-level approach 
for EU financial market legislation and implementation 
was endorsed by the European Council at Stockholm in 
March 2001. It is composed of four "levels", each 
focusing on a specific stage of the implementation of 
legislation. The four-level approach is as follows: Level 1 
consists of legislative acts, namely Directives or 
Regulations, proposed by the Commission following 
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intended to ensure that legislation is 
implemented consistently in all Member States 
and that national supervisory practices converge.  
The immediate economic rationale for financial-
sector integration policies stems from the well-
documented finance-growth nexus, with both 
theoretical and empirical evidence suggesting that 
an efficient financial sector improves investment 
performance and so promotes higher long-term 
output growth (see Box 7). An efficient financial 
sector can improve growth via (a) portfolio 
diversification, where the opportunity to share 
risks may induce savers to allocate a higher 
fraction of their savings to riskier but more 
profitable projects; (b) enhanced quality of 
investment, as greater access to and by 
intermediaries reduces the problem of 
asymmetric information and so raises overall 
investment profitability; and (c) longer-term 
investment, as the availability of liquid financial 
markets allows a larger proportion of savings to 
be invested in longer-term and typically more 
productive projects. 
In the EU, national segmentation has acted as a 
major constraint on the efficiency of the financial 
sector of the Union as a whole. While Member 
State financial sectors have generally been 
efficient from a national perspective, they have 
been much less so when viewed from the 
perspective of a progressively integrating EU 
economy. A significant divergence has emerged 
between the real sector, which increasingly 
operates on a cross-border basis, and the 
financial sector, which remains segmented. The 
degree of segmentation has been such that the 
EU financial sector has not been able to function 
efficiently and so has acted as a drag on the 
overall performance of the EU economy.26  
                                                                              
consultation with all interested parties and adopted under 
the ‘co-decision’ procedure by the Council and the 
European Parliament. At Level 2, the relevant 
implementing measures are adopted. Such measures are 
used to ensure that technical provisions can be kept up to 
date with market developments. Level 3 measures have 
the objective of improving the common and uniform 
implementation of Level 1 and 2 acts in the Member 
States. Level 4 involves compliance and enforcement of 
the new rules and laws through common EU-wide 
practices by supervisors and regulators.  
26 See ’Quantification of the macroeconomic impact of 
integration of EU financial markets‘, London Economics,  
2002; and ’Financial market integration, corporate 
financing and economic growth‘, European Commission, 
But integration can stimulate financial-sector 
development, via two main channels. First, 
benefits will emerge from exploiting the scale 
effects of a greater number of actual and 
potential counterparts for financial transactions. 
The resulting decline in transaction costs 
translates into a lower cost of capital for 
borrowers and higher returns for investors. 
Second, competition among financial 
intermediaries make the intermediation of 
savings to investment even more efficient. 
Finally, integration can also increase financial-
sector development and thereby enhance 
stability, e.g. due to the enhanced risk 
management techniques from foreign entrants 
and additional intermediation channels arising, 
i.e. going beyond traditional banking. As sector 
development and efficiency rises, investment and 
growth performance in the economy is further 
enhanced.  
However, many of the benefits of financial 
integration might be indirect, especially for less 
developed countries. Indeed, summarising the 
literature related to financial globalisation, Kose et 
al. (2006) conclude that the 'main benefits of 
successful financial globalisation are probably 
catalytic and indirect rather than simply enhanced 
access to financing for domestic investment'.27 
They argue that more important than direct 
growth effects of access to more capital is how 
capital flows generate so-called 'potential 
collateral benefits' of financial integration. They 
cite broad support in the literature for the thesis 
that 'financial openness can promote 
development of the domestic financial sector, 
impose discipline on macroeconomic policies, 
generate efficiency gains among domestic firms 
by exposing them to competition from foreign 
entrants, and unleash forces that result in better 
government and corporate governance. 
                                                                              
Directorate General of Economic and Financial Affairs, 
Economic Papers, No. 179, 2002, by  M. Giannetti, L. 
Guiso, T. Jappelli, M. Padula and M. Pagano.  
27  Kose, M.A. et al. (2006), 'Financial globalization: a 
reappraisal', NBER Working Paper Series, No. 12484, 
August.  
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Box 7: Finance and growth 
 
Finance, entrepreneurship and economic growth are interconnected as the financial system enables savers 
to pool funds, and then allocates investment to the highest return activity by addressing problems of 
adverse selection in credit markets. This theoretical link suggests that the development of finance is closely linked 
to economic growth. While empirical work in the field of financial development and economic performance is 
relatively new, evidence would seem to confirm the importance of a well-developed – and hence efficient – financial 
system in boosting economic performance. 
 
A positive link between a developed financial sector and economic performance has been established by a 
number of studies. Building on the work of King and Levine (1993), Levine et al. (2000) establish a strong positive 
link between financial intermediary development and economic growth. Similarly, Beck et al. (2000) find a robust and 
positive link between financial intermediary development and both real per capita GDP growth and total factor 
productivity growth. In a broad overview article, Levine (1997) documents a strong positive link between the 
functioning and development of the financial system as a whole and long-run economic growth.  
 
Both banks and financial markets provide complementary ways of fostering economic growth, with each of 
them having their distinctive advantages (Dolar and Meh, 2002). Similarly, Levine (2002) shows in a broad-based 
cross-country examination that although overall financial development is robustly linked with economic growth, 
financial structure in itself is not a stringent determinant of economic growth. In fact, intermediary-based finance 
and market-based finance may play different roles and the availability of both financing avenues seems to be 
beneficial. 
 
Financial development seems to benefit new entrants and small firms disproportionately. Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) find that financial development influences economic growth rates via the reduction of the cost of external 
finance to financially dependent firms. In that context, the paper suggests that a well-developed financial system may 
play a crucial role in the rise of new firms, while a lack of financial development may favour incumbent firms – able 
to fund themselves through retained profits – over new entrants. Similar results are reached by Beck et al. (2004). 
Giuso et al. (2004) find that local financial development enhances the probability of an individual starting his own 
business, favours entry, increases competition and promotes the growth of firms. The study also shows these effects 
to be weaker for larger firms, which can more easily raise funds outside their local region. 
 
References:  
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3. The state of play of financial 
integration in Europe 
A number of financial market indicators confirm 
increasing integration in the European Union, 
with euro introduction acting as a further 
catalyst. Although product distribution is still 
being hampered by different legal and 
institutional barriers rooted in often centuries- 
old traditions, national contract and property 
laws, financial integration has resulted in a 
common regulatory framework in a number of 
areas, progressively allowing capital to flow more 
easily across borders. 
Graph 29: Relative share of EU countries cross-border 
portfolio investment going to other (i) EU countries, 
(ii) euro area countries and (iii) non euro-area 
countries 
(in % of total cross-border portfolio investment) (1) 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1997 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 into EU countries
into euro-area countries
into non-euro-area EU countries
 
(1) When compared to total cross-border portfolio holdings. As no 
data are available for 1997, the portfolio investments from 
Germany, Luxembourg and Greece are excluded for that year. 
Source: IMF, Commission services. 
As a result, portfolios have been rebalanced to 
improve risk/reward structures reducing home 
bias and leading to increased risk-sharing. 
Calculations based on IMF data demonstrate that 
the relative share of EU countries' cross-border 
portfolio investment going to other EU countries 
increased from roughly 30% in 1997 to around 
42% in 2005 (see Graph 29).28 In other words, 
EU and euro-area countries have increasingly 
invested in each other. Figures show that 
development overwhelmingly benefited the euro 
area as the share of EU countries' portfolio debt 
                                                     
28 As no data are available for 1997, the portfolio 
investments from Germany, Luxembourg and Greece are 
excluded for that year. 
and equity holdings in the single currency area 
increased from 22% to 32% during that period. 
In contrast, the share of portfolio investments 
from EU countries vis-à-vis non-euro-area EU 
countries barely increased at all. The time profile 
of the shift in cross-border portfolios documents 
a sharp acceleration in the EU cross-border 
portfolio investment component between 1997 
and 2001, the run-up to and the early years of the 
euro. This might be explained by pre-euro 
convergence developments as rational forward-
looking economic agents adjusted to changed 
circumstances, also evidenced in the sharply 
lowered borrowing costs in a number of 
prospective euro-area countries, as evidenced by 
the declining yield spread when compared to 
Germany (Graph 30). 
Graph 30: Sovereign yield spread against Germany  
(in %, Jan 1990 to May 2007) 
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(1)10 year segment. 
Source: EcoWin. 
The process of EU financial integration is well 
under way, in particular in wholesale markets but 
increasingly also in retail markets. The pace of 
integration has been fastest in the case of 
financial instruments with agreed definitions, 
common conventions and a common 
infrastructure such as the euro-area inter-bank 
and derivatives markets. Progress has been 
slower for instruments which are more affected 
by national regulations, market conventions, 
taxation, and legal frameworks, such as equities.  
The euro-area derivatives market is highly 
integrated with a sharp expansion of euro interest 
swap activity and the rise of pan-European 
equity-based index trading. As regards the 
integration of money markets, the market for 
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interbank deposits is fully integrated, as 
witnessed by the acceptance by market 
participants of EONIA (Euro Overnight Index 
Average) and EURIBOR (Euro Inter-Bank 
Offered Rate) as uniform price references.  
On the other hand, various technical, regulatory, 
fiscal and legal obstacles relating to clearing and 
settlement are still holding back the integration 
of the secured market segments (e.g. commercial 
paper and treasury bills), which involve the 
exchange of liquidity against collateral.   
Graph 31: Standard deviation of government bond yield 
spreads for two, five and ten year maturities, euro 
area (in basis points – Feb 1993 to Dec 2006)  
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Source: ECB. 
The launch of the euro created a much more 
homogenous EU bond market, with largely 
convergent prices among euro-area Member 
States evidenced in the sharply declining standard 
deviation of government bond yields (Graph 31). 
A deeper and more liquid euro-denominated 
bond market has resulted in higher net and gross 
issuance volumes for the market as a whole, 
when compared to the combined issuance in the 
legacy currencies, resulting in a wider and deeper 
market for bonds issued by the private sector. 
Outstanding bond securities amounted to more 
than 130% of euro-area GDP, up from roughly 
90% of GDP in 1995 (Graph 32). The financial 
sector contributed most to the euro-area bond 
market development, with central banks and 
other monetary and financial institutions (i.e. 
banks) increasing their outstanding bond 
obligations from 32% of euro area GDP in 1995 
to 54% during 2006. In addition, the financial 
sector category including other financial 
intermediaries, pension funds and insurance 
companies enhanced its share of outstanding 
debt obligations when measured against euro 
area GDP from 2.5% to 11.5% during that same 
period. Outstanding debt securities from the 
general government sector rose from roughly 
52% of GDP in 1995 to roughly 56% of GDP in 
2006 and outstanding non-financial corporate 
sector debt securities increased from 5% to 
roughly 8%.  
Graph 32: Debt securities of euro-area residents, 
outstanding amounts, all currencies 
(in % of GDP) 
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(1) Includes other financial intermediaries as well as pension funds 
and insurance companies. 
Source: Commission services. 
In equity markets, the impact of the euro has so 
far been strongest at investor level, with an 
overall reduction in 'home bias' and a re-
orientation of asset managers’ investment 
strategies towards a European-based approach. 
One measure of euro-area equity market 
integration is to compare the dispersions of euro-
area equity returns by country and by sector. In 
an integrated market, equity prices should be 
driven primarily by sector-specific rather than 
country-specific variables. Graph 33 shows that 
the cross-country dispersion has been slightly 
below the respective cross-sector dispersion 
since the end-1990s, co-inciding with the euro 
introduction, while it was clearly above it during 
the previous 25 years. In the euro area, therefore, 
sector-based equity strategies would provide a 
greater degree of diversification than country-
based equity portfolios.  
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Graph 33: Filtered cross-country and cross-sector 
dispersions of equity returns, euro area 
(in % – Feb 1973 to Jan 2007) 
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(1) Based on monthly cross-sectional Hodrick-Prescott filtered total 
equity returns in country and sector. 
Source: ECB. 
• There have been a significant number of 
M&As in the banking sector – still the 
dominant sector in providing euro-area 
financing – although consolidation has 
mainly occurred along national lines due to a 
number of remaining legal and political 
barriers. However, cross-border banking 
M&A picked up during 2005, when several 
large-value transactions were conducted 
(Graph 34).   
Graph 34: Share of cross-border M&A on total banking 
system M&A, euro area  
(in % – in 2000 to 2006) 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  
Source: ECB. 
• Consolidation in euro-area market 
infrastructure can be witnessed in Europe’s 
stock exchanges, where notable examples 
would include the merger of exchanges in 
Amsterdam, Brussels, Paris, and Lisbon in 
Euronext, and the integrated Nordic-Baltic 
market, which includes the stock exchanges 
of Copenhagen, Stockholm, Helsinki, 
Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius. Some progress has 
been made in the integration of payment 
systems, such as TARGET, and in clearing 
and settlement systems. 
4. Benefits and challenges of financial 
integration for economic adjustment 
in the euro area  
Considerable attention has been devoted to the 
question of how to enhance the functioning of 
market-based channels of adjustment in the euro 
area. One strand of literature considers the 
possibility of fostering greater geographical 
labour mobility, while a second considers 
whether monetary union could provide a catalyst 
for structural reform in product, labour and 
capital markets. Less attention has been paid to 
the role of the financial sector in the process of 
adjusting to country-specific shocks. Financial 
markets seem to have had a relatively minor 
impact in inter-country adjustment in the EU 
during the 1970s and 1980s. During the 1990s, 
however, the adjustment role of EU financial 
markets seems to have picked up and is likely to 
have become even more significant after the 
adoption of the euro.  
Integration has the potential to support the 
adjustment role of the euro-area financial sector 
in several ways.  
First, smooth adjustment to country-specific 
shocks means having a financial sector that helps 
to reallocate resources efficiently across sectors 
and firms within an economy. With low labour 
mobility, adjustment to such shocks in the euro-
area context relies heavily on wage and price 
adjustments and it is critical that capital moves 
fluidly to take advantages of such shifts, creating 
new businesses and new jobs. The more 
integrated and efficient the euro-area financial 
sector is, the more it can play a role in the rapid 
regeneration of productive capacity and growth 
across the area as a whole.  
Second, integration can promote greater 
diversification in the financial sector, which in 
turn plays an important role in ensuring 
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resilience. A diverse institutional structure means 
that a broader financial sector is potentially more 
robust than one resting on a few pillars, while the 
availability of alternative intermediation channels 
can avoid the risk of stress in one part of the 
financial sector starving firms or other sectors of 
funds at a time of adjustment stress. Integration 
has already contributed to diversification in the 
euro-area financial sector via the creation of new 
or more liquid markets (e.g. for derivative 
products and corporate bonds) and the 
emergence of non-bank financial intermediaries.   
Third, financial integration can dampen the 
negative effects of country-specific financial 
shocks by promoting innovation by suppliers of 
capital. Recent research at the IMF suggests that 
securitisation of the US national mortgage 
market may have halved the amplitude of local 
real estate cycles by diluting 'credit crunch' 
effects in local downswings.29 Securitisation has 
expanded in the euro-area financial sector since 
1999 (e.g. increased issuance of covered bonds 
and other asset-backed securities), but remains 
underdeveloped and segmented along national 
lines. 
Fourth, financial integration promotes income-
and consumption-smoothing through enhanced 
opportunities for risk-sharing. The theoretical 
basis of income- and consumption-smoothing 
through risk-sharing is well-established: the 
holding of financial assets allows an individual to 
separate his production and consumption 
decisions over time. Subject to a negative shock 
(e.g. a loss of employment and labour income), 
the individual may draw on financial assets to 
maintain consumption while income recovers 
from the shock. Similar reasoning can be 
extended to the regional or country level, where 
the aggregate levels of production and 
consumption can be smoothed over time as 
financial integration provides a form of 
'macroeconomic insurance'. In the US, the role 
of private risk-sharing has been compared to that 
of fiscal transfers, and according to some 
estimates has an even greater impact.30 As there 
                                                     
29  See Schnure, C. (2005), 'Boom-bust cycles in housing: The 
changing role of financial structure', IMF Working Paper, 
No. 05/200, October. 
30  For example, a study by Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha 
(1996) found that capital and credit markets had 
is no federal budget in the euro area, it is logical 
to assume that risk-sharing through financial 
asset diversification could play a predominant 
role in continuing financial-market integration.  
An important message from this is that the euro-
area Member States have even more to gain from 
financial integration than EU Member States 
outside the euro area (and than those 
countries/states participating in monetary unions 
with centralised budgetary policy and labour 
mobility). Such considerations cannot be 
regarded as an argument for the euro area to 'go 
it alone' in financial integration, which would 
make little sense when so much euro-
denominated financial business is conducted 
outside the euro area. Instead, it should be seen 
as a reason for the euro-area Member States to 
move into the vanguard of efforts to create an 
integrated financial market for the EU as a 
whole.  
While financial integration can bring strong 'risk-
reducing' features into the process of economic 
adjustment in the euro area, it may also bring 
additional risks:  
First, there is a change in the nature of financial-
market discipline over economic policies under 
monetary union. The key aspects of this are the 
elimination of currency risk and the ease of 
financing imbalances in highly integrated 
markets, thus inevitably reducing market 
discipline on national economic policies. Such 
changes can mute the signals from the financial 
sector to Member State policy-makers, for 
example, when fiscal policy moves off track or 
when financial inflows are misallocated to less 
productive sectors of the economy. The 
reduction in market discipline since 1999 has 
been aggravated by a more generalised decline in 
risk premia due to ample liquidity and a search 
for yield across the global financial system.   
                                                                              
smoothed over 39% of shocks to gross state product over 
the period 1963-90 compared with less than 13% 
smoothed by the federal budget. Credit markets also 
contributed to a significant amount of smoothing by 
credit markets (23% of all shocks). 'Channels of interstate 
risk sharing: United States 1963-1990’, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 111, pp.1081-1110. 
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Second, deep and integrated financial markets 
will tend to amplify both favourable events and 
distortions in Member State economies. For 
example, asymmetric shocks affecting national 
credit and asset markets in the euro area are no 
longer met with a domestic interest rate 
response. Swings in these financial markets may 
in consequence be wider and more prolonged, 
possibly contributing to amplified cycles in 
economic activity and the real exchange rate. 
While these amplified cycles may not be 
problematic per se, there is a potential for boom-
bust scenarios if too much credit goes into 
housing/consumption and not enough into the 
productive sector, which has a potentially 
negative impact on future reimbursement 
capacity. In such an environment, economic 
growth may be unbalanced and external 
competitiveness impaired.  
Third, financial integration may bring subtle 
changes in the nature of systemic risk in the euro 
area. While financial integration can influence 
adjustment, causality does not run in one 
direction only and the real-sector adjustment 
under the euro area can also have significant 
feedback into financial markets. While the risk of 
acute financial crisis triggered by abrupt 
movements in exchange rates no longer exists for 
euro-area Member States, there is an increased 
risk of financial instability linked to a protracted 
slowdown in economic activity. With nominal 
exchange rates irrevocably fixed, adjustment to 
asymmetric shocks among euro-area Member 
States is a gradual process with the realignment 
of intra-euro real effective exchange rates 
occurring through relative price changes. If the 
adjustment required is large, Member States can 
be trapped in a low-growth cycle for many years, 
with potentially serious implications for the 
health of their financial sectors.    
A dominant theme running through the risk 
factors identified above is that financial 
integration might be a shock in itself. As a result, 
financial sector behaviour might become more 
pro-cyclical following country-specific shocks, at 
least during a learning period. Strong and 
protracted asymmetric booms could lead 
financial-sector agents to underestimate the 
build-up of lending risks, which might then 
crystallise in an extended downturn. Asset market 
movements could be pronounced at times of 
negative local real interest rates and could be 
followed by a protracted downturn in valuations. 
Easy deficit financing and weaker market 
discipline could allow sizeable imbalances to 
accumulate. These elements could increase the 
amplitude and length of adjustment cycles, as 
well as heightening systemic risk.  
5. Summary and conclusion 
There is ample theoretical and empirical evidence 
suggesting a causal link between financial 
development and improved economic 
performance. By allocating financial resources 
and risk efficiently over time and space, the 
financial sector allows real-sector activity to 
expand and develop optimally. To the extent that 
the financial sector may be constrained in 
performing this task, there is a consequent cost 
in terms of sub-optimal economic performance 
and welfare loss. 
The process of financial integration in the EU is 
predicated on the link between financial 
development and improved economic 
performance, and reflects a two-step rationale. 
Integration of Member State financial sectors is 
expected to promote financial development in 
the EU as a whole and this, in turn, should lead 
to a higher potential output in the EU economy. 
As a subset of EU Member States, the 
performance of the euro-area economy can be 
expected to benefit from financial integration 
perhaps to an even higher degree as the absence 
of currency risk on intra-area financial flows 
provides scope for relatively deeper integration.  
Just as the financial integration process has 
benefited from the elimination of currency risk in 
the euro area, the smooth functioning of the 
euro-area economy depends on the extent to 
which the euro is underpinned by an integrated 
financial market. The more specific relevance of 
financial integration for the euro area is based on 
optimal currency area theory. In the absence of 
national exchange rates and monetary policies, 
cross-border financial flows can play a crucial 
role in stabilising income and output at the 
Member State level, by expanding opportunities 
for economic agents to smooth consumption and 
investment over time. This stabilisation role – 
linked to more efficient resource allocation and 
enhanced risk-sharing opportunities – is even 
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more important in a context where cross-border 
labour mobility tends to be limited and there are 
downward rigidities in both real and nominal 
wages. An important message is that the euro-
area Member States have even more to gain from 
financial integration than those Member States 
outside. This is a powerful rationale for euro-area 
Member States to move into the vanguard of 
efforts to create an integrated financial market 
for the EU as a whole. 
However, financial integration also has 
potentially less positive implications for the euro 
area. For instance, a general reduction in risk 
premia and loosened credit constraints have led 
to very large current-account differences between 
Member States, while the elimination of currency 
risk has reduced the effect of market discipline 
on national developments within the euro area. 
There are concerns about the fact that these 
developments have been associated, to some 
degree, with what looks like an excessive loss in 
competitiveness and that the corresponding 
funds have, to a large degree, been channelled 
into private consumption and housing rather 
than corporate investment (but this depends on 
the countries considered).  In sum, the process of 
financial integration has constituted an 
asymmetric shock which has proved to be 
difficult to cope with.  
In a single-currency environment, there are fewer 
macroeconomic policy instruments with which to 
manage the effects of increased financial flows 
between Member States within an integrated 
financial sector. This situation is exacerbated if 
the reduction in available policy instruments is 
not sufficiently internalised by policy makers. 
Moreover, the reduced sensitivity of the 
integrated financial sector to national economic 
developments means that policy makers cannot 
rely on an autonomous private-sector response 
to the emergence of economic disequilibria. 
Accordingly, the benefits of financial integration 
in the economic adjustment process can be 
optimised only if accompanied by policies that 
remove structural rigidities and thus enhance 
economic flexibility, strengthen prudential 
oversight, and ensure a sound fiscal setting, all of 
which helps underpin macroeconomic and 
financial stability.  
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III. Recent DG ECFIN publications  
1. Policy documents 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. No. 2. 2007 
Spring economic forecasts 2007 - 2008 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/forecasts_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. No. 3. 2007 
Public finances in EMU - 2007  
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/public_finances2007_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. No. 4. 2007 
Annual statement and report on the euro area 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2007/euro_area2007_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No. 27. November 2006 
Country Study: Growth and competitiveness in the Polish economy: the road to real convergence 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/2006/occasionalpapers27_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No. 29. April 2007 
Growth, risks and governance: The role of the financial sector in southeastern Europe 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/2007/occasionalpapers29_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No. 30. June 2007 
European Neighbourhood Policy: Economic Review of EU Neighbour Countries 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/2007/occasionalpapers30_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No.31. June 2007 
2006 Pre-accession Economic Programmes of candidate countries 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/2007/occasionalpapers31_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ENLARGMENT PAPERS. No. 29. 2006 
Progress towards meeting the economic criteria for accession: the assessments of the 2006 Progress 
Reports  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/enlargement_papers/elp29_en_.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ENLARGMENT PAPERS. No. 30. 2006 
Western Balkans in Transition 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/enlargement_papers/elp30_en.htm 
2. Analytical documents 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 273.  
Luís Gordo Mora (Banco de España) and João Nogueira Martins (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs) 
How reliable are the statistics for the Stability and Growth Pact? 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2007/economicpapers273_en.htm  
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 274.  
Sven Langedijk and Werner Roeger (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs) 
Adjustment in EMU: A model-based analysis of country experiences 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2007/economicpapers274_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 276.  
Roel M.W.J.Beetsma (University of Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute, CEPR and CESifo) Frederick van der Ploeg 
(EUI, Florence, University of Amsterdam, CEPR and CESifo) 
The political economy of public investment 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2007/economicpapers276_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 277.  
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Fabio Balboni (University of Bologna), Marco Buti, Martin Larch (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affair) 
ECB vs Council vs Commission: Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in the EMU when cyclical 
conditions are uncertain 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2007/economicpapers277_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 278.  
Peter Tillmann (University of Bonn) 
Robust Monetary Policy with the Cost Channel 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2007/economicpapers278_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 279.  
Michael Neugart (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung - WZB) 
Provisions of the welfare state: employment protection versus unemployment insurance 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2007/economicpapers279_en.htm 
3. Regular publications  
Euro area GDP indicator (Indicator-based forecast of quarterly GDP growth in the euro area) 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/economy_finance/indicators/euroareagdp_en.htm 
Business and Consumer Surveys (harmonised surveys for different sectors of the economies in the European 
Union (EU) and the applicant countries)  
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/economy_finance/indicators/businessandconsumersurveys_en.htm 
Business Climate Indicator for the euro area (monthly indicator designed to deliver a clear and early assessment 
of the cyclical situation) 
europa.eu/comm/economy_finance/indicators/businessandconsumersurveys_en.htm 
Key indicators for the euro area (presents the most relevant economic statistics concerning the euro area)  
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/economy_finance/indicators/key_euro_area/keyeuroarea_en.htm 
Monthly and quarterly notes on the euro-denominated bond markets (looks at the volumes of debt issued, the 
maturity structures, and the conditions in the market) 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/economy_finance/publications/bondmarkets_en.htm 
Price and Cost Competitiveness 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/economy_finance/publications/priceandcostcompetiteveness_en.htm 
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IV. Key indicators for the euro area 
 
1 Output 2003 2004 2005 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07
 Industrial confidence 1.1 Balance -11 -5 -8 6 5 5 6 7 6 
 Industrial production 1.2 mom % ch 0.5 2.0 1.3 1.3 -0.6 0.5 0.4   
  2003 2004 2005 05Q4 06Q1 06Q2 06Q3 06Q4 07Q1 
 Gross domestic product 1.3 Qtr. % ch    0.4 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.9 0.6 
2 Private consumption 2003 2004 2005 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07
 Consumer confidence 2.1 Balance -18 -14 -14 -6 -7 -5 -4 -4 -1 
 Retail sales 2.2  mom % ch 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.5 -0.9 0.4 0.5   
  2003 2004 2005 05Q4 06Q1 06Q2 06Q3 06Q4 07Q1 
 Private consumption 2.3 Qtr. % ch 1.3 1.4 e1.4 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.4  
3 Investment 2003 2004 2005 05Q4 06Q1 06Q2 06Q3 06Q4 07Q1 
 Capacity utilization 3.1 % 80.7 81.6 81.3 81.1 82.0 82.5 83.6 83.9 84.4 
 Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 Qtr. % ch 1.0 2.1 2.7 0.5 1.1 2.2 0.9 1.5  
 Change in stocks 3.3 % of GDP 0.0 -0.1  0.4 0.0 0.3 0.2   
4 Labour market 2003 2004 2005 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07
 Unemployment 4.1 % 8.4 8.9 8.5 7.5 7.4 7.3 7.2   
   2003 2004 2005 05Q4 06Q1 06Q2 06Q3 06Q4 07Q1 
 Employment 4.2 Ann. % ch 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.5  
 Shortage of labour 4.3 % 2.5 2.4  2.8 2.8 3.1 4.4 5.0 5.0 
 Wages 4.4 Ann. % ch 2.5 2.2  2.6 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.5  
5 International transactions  2003 2004 2005 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07
 Export order books 5.1 Balance -24 -13 -16 4 2 5 5 5 6 
 World trade 5.2 Bn. EUR 132 146 157 178 181 179 182   
 Exports of goods 5.3 Bn. EUR 1056.0 1142.1 1232.5 121.7 122.0 120.9    
 Imports of goods 5.4 Bn. EUR 970.4 1069.1 1207.3 121.3 119.0 120.6    
 Trade balance 5.5 Bn. EUR 85.6 73.0 25.2 0.4 3.0 0.3    
   2003 2004 2005 05Q4 06Q1 06Q2 06Q3 06Q4 07Q1 
 Exports of goods and services 5.6 Qtr. % ch 1.1 6.8 4.2 0.8 3.2 1.0 1.9 3.6  
 Imports of goods and services 5.7 Qtr. % ch 3.1 6.7 5.2 1.7 2.4 0.9 2.2 1.7  
   2003 2004 2005 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07
 Current account balance 5.8 Bn. EUR 18.1 42.4 38.8 6.8 3.5 -3.7 5.4   
 Direct investment (net) 5.9 Bn. EUR -18.4 -39.7 -41.8 -28.3 -5.0 -12.4 -8.1   
 Portfolio investment (net) 5.10 Bn. EUR -9.4 39.0 32.3 35.8 39.0 26.2 71.7   
6 Prices  2003 2004 2005 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07
 HICP 6.1 Ann. % ch 2.1 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 
 Core HICP 6.2 Ann. % ch 2.0 2.1 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9  
 Producer prices 6.3 Ann. % ch 1.6 2.3 4.1 3.5 2.9 2.8 2.7   
 Import prices6.4 Ann. % ch 102.5 97.2 104.8       
7 Monetary and financial indicators  2003 2004 2005 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07
 Interest rate (3 months) 7.1 % p.a. 2.3 2.1 2.2 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.8 4.1 
 Bond yield (10 years) 7.2 % p.a. 4.1 4.1 3.4 3.8 4.0 4.1 4.0 4.2 4.3 
 ECB repo rate 7.3  % p.a. 3.25 2.75  3.50 3.50 3.75 3.75 3.75 4.00 
 Stock markets 7.4  Index 2420 2805 3207 4070 4160 4230 4070 4337 4441 
 M3 7.5 Ann. % ch 7.8 5.9 7.4 9.7 9.9 10.0 10.9 10.4  
 Credit to private sector (loans) 7.6 Ann. % ch 5.0 6.0 8.1 10.7 10.6 10.3 10.5 10.3  
 Exchange rate USD/EUR 7.7 Value 1.13 1.24 1.24 1.32 1.30 1.31 1.32 1.35 1.35 
 Nominal effective exchange rate 7.8 Index 106.4 109.8 109.7 114.1 113.4 113.8 115.0 116.0  
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Number Indicator Note Source 
1 Output   
1.1 Industrial confidence 
indicator  
Industry survey, average of balances to replies on production expectations, 
order books, and stocks (the latter with inverted sign) 
ECFIN 
1.2 Industrial production  Volume, excluding construction, wda Eurostat 
1.3 Gross domestic product  Volume (1995), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
2 Private consumption   
2.1 Consumer confidence 
indicator  
Consumer survey, average of balances to replies on four questions (financial 
and economic situation, unemployment, savings over next 12 months) 
ECFIN 
2.2 Retail sales Volume, excluding motor vehicles, wda Eurostat 
2.3 Private consumption Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3 Investment   
3.1 Capacity utilisation  In percent of full capacity, manufacturing, seasonally adjusted, survey data 
(collected in each January, April, July and October). 
ECFIN 
3.2 Gross fixed capital 
formation  
Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3.3 Change in stocks In percent of GDP, volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4 Labour market   
4.1 Unemployment  In percent of total workforce, ILO definition, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4.2 Employment  Number of employees, partially estimated, seasonally adjusted ECB/ 
Eurostat 
4.3 Shortage of labour Percent of firms in the manufacturing sector reporting a shortage of labour 
(unfilled job openings) as a constraint to production, seasonally adjusted  
ECFIN 
4.4 Wages  Not fully harmonised concept, but representative for each Member State 
(mostly hourly earnings) 
ECFIN 
5 International transactions  
5.1 Export order books Industry survey; balance of positive and negative replies, seasonally adjusted ECFIN 
5.2 World trade Volume, 1998=100, seasonally adjusted CPB 
5.3 Exports of goods Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, fob Eurostat 
5.4 Imports of goods  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, cif Eurostat 
5.5 Trade balance Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, fob-cif Eurostat 
5.6 Exports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.7 Imports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.8 Current account balance  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions; before 1997 partly 
estimated 
ECB 
5.9 Direct investment   (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
5.10 Portfolio investment  (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
6 Prices   
6.1 HICP  Harmonised index of consumer prices Eurostat 
6.2 Core HICP Harmonised index of consumer prices, excluding energy and unprocessed 
food 
Eurostat 
6.3 Producer prices Without construction Eurostat 
6.4 Import prices Import unit value index for goods  Eurostat 
7 Monetary and financial indicators  
7.1 Interest rate  Percent p.a., 3-month interbank money market rate, period averages Ecowin 
7.2 Bond yield Percent p.a., 10-year government bond yields, lowest level prevailing in the 
euro area, period averages 
Ecowin 
7.3 ECB repo rate Percent p.a., minimum bid rate of the ECB, end of period Ecowin 
7.4 Stock markets  DJ Euro STOXX50 index, period averages Ecowin 
7.5 M3  Seasonally adjusted moving average moving average (3 last months)  ECB 
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7.6 Credit to private sector 
(loans) 
MFI loans to euro-area residents excluding MFIs and general government, 
monthly values: month end values, annual values: annual averages 
ECB 
7.7 Exchange rate USD/EUR  Period averages ECB 
7.8 Nominal effective exchange 
rate 
Against 13 other industrialised countries, double export weighted, 1995 = 
100, increase (decrease): appreciation (depreciation) 
ECFIN 
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